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Abstract 
This dissertation seeks to answer questions regarding changes in the competitive 
environment in international air travel markets which has undergone rapid changes since the 
early 1990s.  Specifically, the research in this dissertation examines policies regarding 
cooperation among airlines in international air travel markets as well as how cooperation affects 
an airline‟s product quality.  These issues are explored in two essays which comprise my 
dissertation. 
The first essay explores the efficacy of a policy known as a carve-out.  Airlines wanting 
to cooperatively set prices for their international air travel service must apply to the relevant 
authorities for antitrust immunity (ATI).  While cooperation may yield benefits, it can also have 
anti-competitive effects in markets where partners competed prior to receiving ATI.  A carve-out 
policy forbids ATI partners from cooperating in markets policymakers believe will be most 
harmed by anti-competitive effects.  We examine carve-out policy applications to three ATI 
partner pairings, and find evidence of tacit collusion in carve-out markets in spite of the policy, 
calling into question whether consumers benefited from application of the policy in the cases 
studied. 
The second essay examines the relationship between product quality and airline 
cooperation. Much of the literature on airline cooperation focuses on the price effects of 
cooperation.  The key contribution of our paper is to empirically examine the product quality 
effects of airline cooperation.  Two common types of cooperation among airlines involve 
international alliances and antitrust immunity (ATI), where ATI allows for more extensive 
cooperation.  The results suggest that increases in the membership of a carrier‟s alliance or ATI 
partners are associated with the carrier‟s own products having more travel-convenient routing 
quality.  Therefore, a complete welfare evaluation of airline cooperation must account for both 
price and product quality effects. 
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Chapter 1 - Assessing Firm Behavior in Carve-out Markets: 
Evidence on the Impact of Carve-out Policy 
 1.1 Introduction 
 Since the early 1990‟s, there has been an increasing trend in cooperation among 
international carriers in the airline industry.  This is in part due to international restrictions that 
limit foreign carriers' service in domestic markets.  Cooperation can effectively allow carriers 
entry into foreign markets.  International carriers can establish a type of cooperation referred to 
as a codeshare agreement.  A codeshare agreement allows a carrier to operate a flight under the 
guise of a partner carrier.  Carriers in a codeshare agreement can sell tickets for flights on an 
itinerary in which a partner carrier operates at least one coupon segment on the itinerary.  The 
result is a passenger may fly with at least one carrier on the trip itinerary that is different from 
the carrier that sold the ticket for the entire trip to the passenger.  Additionally, international 
alliances allow for the carriers in the alliance to coordinate flight schedules (to decrease layover 
times), streamline luggage checking, share frequent flier programs and decrease gate proximity 
at airports, all of which improve travel conveniences for passengers.   
 There are three major international alliances: Skyteam, Star and Oneworld.  Carriers in 
each of these alliances may have codeshare agreements with other carriers within that alliance.  It 
should be noted, however, that carriers within an alliance may also have codeshare agreements 
with carriers outside of the alliance. 
 International carriers within an alliance may also apply to the antitrust enforcement 
authority of a country for antitrust immunity (ATI), which if granted would exempt certain 
cooperative actions between the carriers from being the basis of prosecution under the country's 
antitrust laws.  Codesharing and ATI differ in the extent of cooperation allowed.  Specifically, in 
addition to all of the cooperation associated with codesharing, if a carrier has ATI with another 
carrier then the ATI partners can cooperate with respect to setting fares.  In the U.S., it is the 
Department of Transportation (DOT) that is tasked with reviewing applications from airlines for 
ATI.  The DOT can deny the carriers ATI, grant the carriers ATI or grant the carriers ATI along 
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with a carve-out.  A carve-out is a legal restriction that forbids collusive behavior between ATI 
partners in certain markets.
1
 
 There has been an extensive amount of research regarding the market effects of varying 
forms of cooperation between carriers in international air travel markets; however, research 
regarding carve-outs is limited.  There has been no previous empirical research regarding the 
market effects of policymakers imposing carve-outs, which is the primary contribution of this 
study.  To understand why a carve-out may be put in place, we must first understand the effects 
of granting carriers ATI. 
 Brueckner (2001) uses a theoretical model to analyze what may happen to prices and 
welfare as a result of price cooperation.  The results suggest the effects depend on the type of 
market being considered.  In other words, ATI will have different effects in interline markets 
versus interhub markets.  Interline markets are markets in which a passenger must switch 
operating carriers at some point on their journey.  Interhub markets are markets between the 
carriers‟ hubs in which a passenger is not required to transfer across operating carriers to 
complete their journey.  The key distinction between these two types of markets is that the 
partner carriers' transportation services are complementary in interline markets, but substitutable 
in the interhub markets.  Brueckner‟s (2001) results suggest that ATI will lead to lower prices in 
the interline markets.  The author argues that this occurs as a result of elimination of double 
marginalization in the interline markets.  However, the findings show that in interhub markets, 
where the carriers directly compete, cooperation will have an anticompetitive effect (raise fares).  
Brueckner (2001) notes the cooperation by the carriers may induce some cost efficiencies in all 
markets (interline as well as interhub) due to the impact of economies of passenger-traffic 
density.
2
  These cost efficiencies have a countervailing effect to the anticompetitive effect in the 
interhub markets.  Thus, if the cost efficiencies in the interhub market are sufficiently large, 
prices may fall in the interhub market and passenger traffic may rise. 
                                                 
1
 In the European Union, the European Commission (EC) is tasked with granting carriers ATI.  Note that the DOT 
only has jurisdiction over international itineraries originating in the United States.  For a more thorough discussion 
of the process and rulings regarding ATI and carve-outs, see Bilotkach and Huschelrath (2011 and 2012).   
2
 Economies of passenger-traffic density is the phrase given to the situation in which an airline is able to lower the 
marginal cost of transporting a given passenger on a route the larger the volume of passengers it transports through 
the route. 
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 Brueckner and Whalen (2000) attempt to empirically determine the effects of different 
degrees of cooperation on prices in interline markets and interhub markets.  Using reduced-form 
linear regression analysis, the researchers examine the effects of both codesharing and ATI.  The 
results are consistent with the theory that prices will fall in interline markets with greater degrees 
of cooperation.  Codesharing works to lower prices, but ATI has a greater effect on lowering 
prices.  The argument is that codesharing does not fully eliminate the double marginalization.  
Brueckner and Whalen (2000) also attempt to determine the effect of changes in competition in 
interhub markets.  When carriers are granted ATI, there will effectively be less competition in 
the interhub markets.  Contrary to what the theory suggests, the findings show that there is no 
statistically significant effect on prices as a result of lower competition. 
 Brueckner (2003b) builds on the literature by empirically investigating the effects of 
codesharing and ATI for interline markets.  The empirical analysis controls for the endogeneity 
of codesharing. The estimates provide evidence that cooperation lowers prices for passengers in 
the interline markets.  Specifically, codesharing and ATI each have the effect of lowering prices, 
but ATI has a much larger effect on prices than codesharing.  The findings support the argument 
that greater degrees of cooperation will further diminish double marginalization. 
 Whalen (2007) estimates a model that examines the impact that codeshare agreements 
and ATI have on prices as well as passenger traffic in interline markets.  The contribution here 
was the use of panel data in the econometric model.  Whalen (2007) used data spanning from 
1990 through 2000.  Using panel data for the analysis is very useful as these data provide 
relevant information before and after some alliances are formed as well as after an alliance is 
eliminated.  The estimates support the theory that prices will fall in interline markets with 
codesharing and ATI.  ATI has a larger impact on prices versus codesharing.  Likewise, 
consistent with the theory, the estimates suggest that passenger traffic will increase with 
cooperation.   
 Brueckner, Lee and Singer (2011) using data spanning from 1998 through 2009, attempt 
to determine if the results from previous studies continue to be valid.  The researchers examine 
the effects of codesharing and ATI for different types of passengers.  The findings provide 
 4 
further support for the theoretical conclusions.  The results suggest that a greater degree of 
cooperation lowers prices for interline passengers.
3
 
 Although there are numerous studies examining the effects of ATI, the literature 
regarding carve-outs is limited.  Brueckner and Proost (2010) theoretically examine the effects of 
a carve-out.  The purpose is to understand when a carve-out is beneficial or harmful to 
consumers.  The theory suggests that ATI will be anticompetitive in the interhub markets serving 
to increase prices for passengers.  However, in the presence of economies of passenger-traffic 
density, ATI will bring cost efficiencies to the carriers.  Only in the case of a joint venture 
alliance will the carriers be able to fully achieve the cost efficiencies.  These cost efficiencies can 
be passed on to the passengers in the form of lower prices.  Depending on which effect is greater, 
prices may rise or fall in the interhub markets.  Should potential economies of passenger-traffic 
density be pronounced, imposing a carve-out in principle limits cooperation, which in turn limits 
the ability to exploit economies of passenger-traffic densities potentially resulting in higher 
prices versus the alternative of no carve-out. 
 Brueckner and Picard (2012) theoretically explore the incentives of carriers that have 
been given ATI to tacitly cooperate in the interhub markets when faced with a carve-out in that 
market.  More specifically, the question asked is whether greater cooperation in the interline 
markets increases the incentive to collude in the interhub.  The idea here is that although the 
carriers are forbidden from jointly setting prices in the interhub markets, there may be an 
incentive for tacit collusion.  For instance, one of the carriers raises the prices for their flights in 
the market and, likewise, the other carrier raises their prices without any prior discussion 
between the carriers.  Should this occur, this would impose a problem for regulators in 
implementing an effective carve-out, as the carve-out may not influence the outcome resulting 
from cooperative behavior of partner carriers.  However, the theoretical predictions suggest that 
under certain circumstances typically assumed in the literature there exists no incentive for tacit 
collusion. 
 The main purpose of this paper is to empirically determine the impact a carve-out has on 
prices, marginal costs and markups.  The goal here is to provide insights into how ATI partner 
                                                 
3
 Numerous additional studies relating cooperation in international markets to prices include, but are not limited to: 
Bilotkach (2005), Brueckner (2003a), Flores-Fillol and Moner-Colonques (2007),  Gayle and Xie (2014), Hassin 
and Shy (2004) and Park and Zhang (2000). 
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carriers behave in the carve-out markets relative to non-carve-out markets.  In other words, do 
the carriers act in accordance with the carve-out or is there evidence of collusion in the carve-out 
markets?  The following is a brief description of the research methodology we use to investigate 
these issues.  
 We begin by specifying and estimating a discrete choice demand model of international 
air travel.  We then assume that multiproduct carriers set travel product prices according to a 
Nash equilibrium.  Conditional on the demand parameter estimates, the Nash equilibrium 
assumption allows us to compute markups and recover marginal costs of the products offered by 
the carriers.  The structural model affords us the opportunity to compute markups and recover 
marginal costs under two alternative scenarios: (1) where we assume the carriers that are given 
ATI jointly set their product prices in all markets, even markets designated as carve-outs; and (2) 
where we assume the ATI partner carriers jointly set their product prices in all markets except 
the carve-out markets, as required by a carve-out policy.  Based on Vuong (1989), we then 
employ a Vuong-type non-nested likelihood ratio test to determine under which price-setting 
assumption the data provides a better goodness of fit.
4
  In the combined subsamples of the 
American (AA)/LAN-Chile (LA), Delta (DL)/Air France (AF) and United (UA)/Air Canada 
(AC) ATI pairings, the non-nested test result suggests that the model in which these partner 
carriers jointly set their product prices in all markets, including the carve-out markets, has better 
statistical support from systematic patterns in the data.  This is an important result as it indicates 
there may be some tacit collusion occurring between the ATI partners in the carve-out markets. 
 Given our product-level computations of markups and marginal costs, we subsequently 
specify and estimate markup and marginal cost functions.  We also specify a reduced-form price 
regression that allows us to estimate the effect a carve-out has on overall prices.  The regression 
estimates provide some intriguing results.  For instance, estimates from the markup regressions 
suggest that each ATI pairing in question may be engaged in some tacit collusion.  This is 
evident from the result that markups on the ATI partners‟ products relative to competitors‟ 
products are at least as great in the carve-out markets relative to the non-carve-out markets for 
each ATI pairing examined.  However, in the case of the AA/LA ATI pairing, the evidence does 
                                                 
4
 Gasmi, Laffont and Vuong (1992) similarly use non-nested likelihood ratio tests to examine cooperative behavior 
of Coca-Cola and Pepsi in the soft drink market.  For a more complete survey of applications of this type of 
statistical test, see Kadiyali, Sudhir and Rao (2001). 
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not suggest that potential efficiencies of cooperation are being realized in their carve-out 
markets.  This does not bode well for consumers.  The tacit collusion coupled with unrealized 
efficiencies of cooperation each act to raise prices for consumers.  AA/LA prices relative to 
competitors‟ prices are on average $506 greater in their carve-out markets versus their non-
carve-out markets.  The findings regarding DL and AF suggest relative product marginal costs 
are no different between their carve-out and non-carve-out markets.  However, their products‟ 
prices relative to competitors‟ prices are on average $174 greater in their carve-out markets.  In 
the case of the UA/AC ATI pairing, there is some indication that tacit cooperation may be taking 
place, however, there is also evidence of realized cost efficiencies in their carve-out markets.  
Overall, the realized cost efficiencies seem to be sufficient to result in lower relative prices on 
average for UA and AC products in their carve-out markets on the order of approximately $193. 
 The paper proceeds as follows.  In section 1.2 we provide discussion of examples in 
which the DOT granted carriers ATI with carve-outs.  In section 1.3 we discuss the data and 
define the variables used in the analysis.  Section 1.4 discusses the econometric model used in 
the analysis.  Section 1.5 discusses estimates from the demand model, Section 1.6 discusses the 
empirical results regarding the outcomes of partner carriers' behavior in their carve-out markets, 
and Section 1.7 provides a brief discussion and some concluding comments. 
 
 1.2 Examples of ATI Decisions and Associated Carve-outs 
 Given the benefits that cooperation has been found to convey, ATI has been granted to 
numerous airline partnerships since the DOT‟s first approval in 1993 of the partnership between 
Northwest and KLM.
5
  However, theory suggests cooperation between partner carriers will result 
in anticompetitive effects in interhub markets, which harm passengers in these markets.  As a 
result, the DOT may impose a carve-out in the interhub market, which effectively forbids 
collusion between ATI partner carriers in markets the policymaker designate as carve-out.  The 
carve-out is meant to eliminate the anticompetitive effects.  However, in the case that ATI allows 
the partner carriers to achieve  cost efficiencies (even in the interhub markets), the carve-out may 
negate some of these cost efficiencies.  The DOT must weigh these potential costs and benefits 
when deciding to impose a carve-out. 
                                                 
5
 There were no carve-outs given in this first ATI ruling by the DOT 
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 The DOT‟s first approval of ATI with a carve-out was in the case of United Airlines and 
Lufthansa in 1996.  The DOT imposed a carve-out in the Chicago-Frankfurt and Washington 
D.C.-Frankfurt markets.  United Airlines was also given ATI with Air Canada in 1997 where 
carve-outs in two markets were imposed.  Similarly, United Airlines was given ATI with Air 
New Zealand in 2001 where carve-outs in two markets were imposed.  United Airlines is 
currently involved in five separate ATI agreements where three are subject to carve-outs.
6
 
 American Airlines was first given ATI with Canadian Airlines in 1996 with carve-outs in 
the New York-Toronto market; although, this particular ATI agreement ceased in 2007.  As of 
this writing, American Airlines has three separate ATI agreements: one with LAN and LAN-
Peru (two carve-outs), one with British Airways, Iberia, Finnair and Royal Jordanian (no carve-
outs) as well as one with Japan Airlines (no carve-outs). 
 In 1996 the DOT granted ATI to Delta and three foreign carriers (Austrian Airlines, 
Sabena and Swissair).  There were numerous carve-outs in this ruling by the DOT.  Additionally, 
in 2002 there was another ATI ruling regarding Delta that included three different foreign 
carriers: Air France, Alitalia and Czech Airlines (this was expanded later in 2002 to include a 
fourth foreign carrier, Korean Air Lines).  With this ruling, two carve-outs were implemented.  
The carve-outs were in the Atlanta-Paris and Cincinnati-Paris markets.  In the case of the latter 
ATI decision regarding Delta, the ATI partnership was expanded to include Northwest in 2008.  
However, in this expansion, the previously implemented carve-outs were removed.  The 
rationale posited is that a joint-venture among Delta, Northwest, Air France and KLM would 
allow the carriers to exploit potential cost efficiencies and provide an overall benefit to 
passengers.  Additionally, it is believed that granting the carriers ATI would not significantly 
lessen competition in those markets.
7
 
 
                                                 
6
 For a complete history of ATI decisions and associated carve-outs, see Table A.1 and Table A.2 in the appendix. 
7
 See U.S. Department of Transportation Office of the Secretary, Final Order 2008-5-32, May 22, 2008. 
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 1.3 Data, Definitions and Descriptive Statistics 
 Data and Sample Selection 
 The data used in the study are from the International Passenger Origin and Destination 
Survey obtained from the U.S. Department of Transportation.  The survey is taken quarterly and 
contains a 10% sample of itineraries for international air travel where at least one segment on the 
itinerary is operated by a U.S. carrier.  Within the dataset, each observation contains information 
regarding the price of the itinerary, origin airport, destination airport, intermediate airport stops, 
number of passengers that purchased the particular itinerary, flight distance between each 
intermediate stop, ticketing carrier(s) for each coupon segment and operating carrier(s) for each 
coupon segment.  The data used in the study span from the first quarter of 2005 through the 
fourth quarter of 2010. 
 Our sample is restricted to itineraries that meet the following criteria.  First, we keep only 
itineraries that are roundtrip.  Itineraries that involve multiple ticketing carriers are also 
eliminated.  Additionally, itineraries that include the origin or destination as an intermediate stop 
or where the destination is another U.S. location are dropped.  Itineraries where an intermediate 
stop is stopped at multiple times on the going or coming portion of the itinerary are also 
discarded.  Finally, we eliminate itineraries with a price less than $100 or greater than $10,000. 
 We define a market as an origin airport and destination airport combination at a particular 
time period.  For instance, travel from ORD (O‟Hare International Airport in Chicago, U.S.) to 
FRA (Frankfurt Airport in Frankfurt, Germany) is a separate market than ORD to CDG (Charles 
de Gaulle Airport in Paris, France).  Likewise, travel from ORD to FRA in the first quarter of 
2005 is a separate market than ORD to FRA in the second quarter of 2005.  A product offered 
within a market is defined by the unique combination of ticketing carrier, group of operating 
carriers, and sequence of airports on the travel itinerary.   
 The number of itineraries in the dataset are very large and in many cases repeated 
multiple times.  Thus, to further simplify our analysis we collapse the itineraries in each market 
based on defined products.  We obtain the price of a product by the mean price for which the 
product was purchased, and the quantity sold, q, as the number of passengers that purchased the 
itinerary.  All prices are converted to 2005 dollars using the consumer price index.  In our final 
sample, there are a total of 1,791,108 observations/products and 475,639 different markets. 
 9 
 To fully examine the effect that a carve-out has on prices, markups and marginal costs for 
carriers that have been granted ATI, one must identify the markets in which the ATI partner 
carriers each offer products, i.e. markets in which the ATI partners service overlap, where a 
subset of these markets are designated as carve-out for the carriers.  This allows us to compare 
the prices, markups and marginal costs for carriers with ATI in non-carve-out markets versus 
carve-out markets.  In the dataset, there were three such instances in which carriers with ATI 
each offered products in carve-out markets as well as other markets.  This is the case with the 
UA/AC, DL/AF and AA/LA ATI partner pairings.  For instance, UA and AC are subject to 
carve-outs in the Chicago/Toronto and San Francisco/Toronto markets.  UA and AC each offered 
products in these two carve-out markets.  It is also the case that UA and AC each offered 
products in other markets including, but not limited to the following: Denver/Toronto and 
Newark/Vancouver.  As a result, we focus our attention to the three aforementioned ATI partner 
pairings and their respective carve-outs.  Table 1.1 illustrates the defined carve-out markets in 
our sample that we analyze. 
 
Table 1.1 Carve-out Markets in the Data Sample that we Ananalyze 
Carriers Carve-out markets Sample date begin (Q/YR) Sample date end (Q/YR) 
United/Air Canada Chicago-Toronto 1/2005 4/2010 
  San Francisco-Toronto 1/2005 4/2010 
Delta/Air France Atlanta-Paris 1/2005 3/2008 
  Cincinnati-Paris 1/2005 3/2008 
American/LAN-Chile Miami-Santiago 1/2005 4/2010 
*Note the carve-outs markets are defined using the respective carrier's hub in the city. 
 
 Variable Definitions 
 Codesharing is defined as a situation in which the carrier that sells the travel ticket to the 
passenger (the ticketing carrier), differs from the carrier that owns the plane that transports the 
passenger (the operating carrier).  The first step in creating a codeshare variable is to account for 
regional carriers in the sample.  We make the assumption that the regional carriers operate for a 
major carrier.  For example, consider the case of the domestic regional carrier SkyWest Airlines 
(OO).  In our sample the assumption is made that SkyWest Airlines is operating local routes 
within the US for the major US ticketing carrier, where the major US ticketing carrier often 
transports passengers internationally using its own planes.  Therefore, in the sample the ticketing 
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carrier/operating carrier, UA/OO, would be converted to UA/UA and not classified as 
codesharing between these carriers.  As such, following much of the literature on airline 
codesharing, our study focuses on codesharing between major carriers.    
  Codeshare variables are created regarding the type of codesharing between carriers on 
certain portions of a given itinerary.  We construct variables that correspond to three types of 
codesharing.  One type of codeshare variable is defined as Trad_1_going.  Trad_1_going is a 
zero-one dummy variable that takes a value of one only if at least one coupon segment of the 
going portion of the product is operated by the ticketing carrier, and at least one coupon segment 
is operated by a carrier other than the ticketing carrier.  Likewise, Trad_1_coming, accounts for 
this type of codesharing on the coming portion of the product.  Trad_2_going (Trad_2_coming) 
is a zero-one dummy variable that takes a value of one only if the ticketing carrier is not an 
operating carrier on the going (coming) portion of the product, and there are multiple operating 
carriers on this going(coming) portion of the product.  Virtual_going (Virtual_coming) is a zero-
one dummy variable that takes a value of one only if the ticketing carrier is different than the 
operating carrier, and all coupon segments on the going (coming) portion are operated by the 
same carrier.  Last, certain portions of a given itinerary may not involve any codesharing and are 
classified as online.  Online_going (Online_coming) is a zero-one dummy variable that takes a 
value of one only if the ticketing carrier is the operating carrier for all coupon segments on the 
going (coming) portion of the product. 
 Other variables used in the analysis include, Opres, a measure of the size of an airline's 
presence at the origin airport.  Variable Opres takes a value equal to the number of destination 
airports that a carrier has non-stop flights to leaving from the specific origin airport.  In contrast, 
variable MC_opres takes on a value equal to the number of airports that a carrier offers non-stop 
flights from that goes to the origin airport.  Given that the origin airport for each itinerary is 
located in the U.S., MC_opres is calculated using the Domestic Passenger Origin and Destination 
Survey.  This dataset is maintained by the U.S. Department of Transportation and is the domestic 
equivalent to the international dataset.   
 The idea for two different presence variables is that Opres is more appropriate for partly 
explaining variations in demand across airlines, while MC_opres is more appropriate for partly 
explaining variations in marginal cost across airlines.  Opres is more appropriate for partly 
explaining variations in demand as consumers likely care about how many different destinations 
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to which an airline flies non-stop from the passenger's origin airport.  MC_opres is more 
appropriate for explaining variations in marginal cost across airlines since a larger MC_opres 
value for an airline at an airport indicates that the airline can channel larger volumes of 
passengers through the airport, which may facilitate the airline being better able to exploit 
economies of passenger-traffic density.  Economies of passenger-traffic density is the phrase 
given to the situation in which an airline is able to lower the marginal cost of transporting a given 
passenger on a route the larger the volume of passengers it transports through the route. 
 Nonstop_going (Nonstop_coming) is a zero-one dummy variable that takes a value of one 
only if the going (coming) portion of the product is a non-stop flight between the origin and 
destination.  Itinerary_dist_going (Itinerary_dist_coming) is a variable that measures the flying 
distance of the going (coming) portion of the product.  Route_qual_going (Route_qual_coming) 
is a measure of the routing quality of the going (coming) portion of the product.  It is defined as 
the minimum flying distance going to (coming from) the destination airport in the origin-
destination market as a percentage of the actual flying distance on the going (coming) portion of 
the itinerary for the product for which the routing quality is being measured.  If 
Route_qual_going (Route_qual_coming) takes on the maximum value of 100, then in terms of 
flying distance this is the most travel-convenient routing offered in the market for the going 
(coming) portion of the trip.
8
 
 Close_comp_going (Close_comp_coming) is a variable that indicates the number of other 
products in the market with the same number of coupon segments on the going (coming) portion 
of the product, where these other competing products are not offered by the airline that offers the 
product for which the Close_comp_going (Close_comp_coming) measure is computed.  Finally, 
the observed product share, denoted by Sjmt, is the market share of product j in origin-destination 
pair, m, at time t.  Sjmt is calculated as the quantity sold of the product, qjmt, divided by the 
number of potential consumers for the market, POPmt, (measured by the population size of the 
origin city).
9
  Table 1.2 shows summary statistics for the aforementioned variables. 
  
                                                 
8
 See Chen and Gayle (2014) for a detailed discussion of this distance-based measure of routing quality. 
9
 Since product shares are extremely small values when using population size to measure potential market size, 
product shares are scaled up by a factor of 100. 
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Table 1.2 Descriptive Statistics 
(2005Q1 - 2010Q4) 
Variable Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
Real_price
1
 979.28 901.90 89.55 9,992 
Quantity 5.62 39.12 1 5,812 
Sjmt 1.72e-3 0.01 1.18e-5 0.95 
Opres 26.48 40.56 0 265 
MC_opres 24.08 31.15 0 182 
Nonstop_going 0.04 0.20 0 1 
Nonstop_coming 0.04 0.20 0 1 
Itinerary_dist_going 3,949.23 2,485.02 96 17,801 
Itinerary_dist_coming 3,952.83 2,488.72 96 17,586 
Route_qual_going 94.07 9.28 35.71 100 
Route_qual_coming 94.00 9.36 28.28 100 
Close_comp_going 6.02 9.68 0 116 
Close_comp_coming 5.97 9.62 0 112 
Trad_1_going 0.16 0.36 0 1 
Trad_1_coming 0.16 0.37 0 1 
Trad_2_going 1.57e-3 0.04 0 1 
Trad_2_coming 2.09e-3 0.05 0 1 
Virtual_going 0.02 0.14 0 1 
Virtual_coming 0.02 0.15 0 1 
Observations 1,791,108 
   Markets 475,639 
   1. Measured in constant year 2005 dollars 
 
 1.4 Model 
 Demand 
 A nested logit model is used to capture consumer‟s choice behavior among differentiated 
air travel products sold in international air travel markets.  In each market we assume the number 
of potential consumers is equal to the population size in the originating city, POP.  Each 
consumer, denoted by c, can choose any one of J + 1 options, j = 0,1,…,J.  The outside 
option/good (j = 0) represents the consumer‟s choice to not purchase any of the j = 1,…,J 
differentiated air travel products in the market, which effectively represents the consumer‟s 
choice not to fly internationally.   
 The products within each market are organized into G + 1 mutually exclusive groups, g 
= 0,1,…,G.  The products within each group are closer substitutes than the substitutability of 
products across groups.  Groups are defined based on products offered by the same ticketing 
carrier.  
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 Given this information, each consumers‟ discrete choice optimization problem is to 
choose the alternative that yields them the highest utility: 
 
      {        }{                                  
 }.   (1) 
 
The term      represents the mean utility across all consumers that purchase product j.  Here, m 
indexes an origin airport and destination airport combination, and t indexes the time period.  
     , is a random compenent of utility common to all products in group g.       
  is a random 
component of utility specific to consumer c from consuming product j.  δ is a parameter that lies 
within the range of 0 to 1 and measures the consumer‟s correlation of preference across products 
within the same group.  As δ approaches 1, consumers view products within the same group as 
closer substitutes.  The random components       and      
 
 have distributions such that 
                   
  has type 1 extreme value distribution.  
The mean utility,     , is specified as a linear function of product characteristics: 
 
            
               .       (2) 
 
Thus, the mean utility from consuming product j is a function of the price of product j,     ,  a 
vector of observed non-price product characteristics,     , and an error term,     , representing 
the unobserved (by the researchers) product characteristics.     and   are parameters to be 
estimated in the demand model. 
 The nested logit model yields the following predicted share function for product j: 
 
           
         
   *
  
      
+
  
   
  
    
   ∑   
     
   
     (3) 
 
where              
  
    
 , and the specification of    is given in equation (2).  The subscript 
notations for market have been dropped only for convenience.  The demand for product j is given 
by the following:  
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                   (4) 
 
where   ,    and δ are the parameters to be estimated in the demand model. 
 
4.2 Supply 
 To facilitate modeling supply of air travel products that involve codesharing, we assume 
that the ticketing carrier of the product markets and sets the final price for the round-trip ticket 
and compensates operating carrier(s) for operating services provided.  Unfortunately for 
researchers, partner airlines do not publicize details of how they compensate each other on their 
codeshare flights, so we face the challenge of specifying a modeling approach that captures our 
basic understanding of what is commonly known about how a codeshare agreement works 
without imposing too much structure on a contracting process about which we have few facts.  
The approach we use to model supply of products that involve codesharing is also used by Chen 
and Gayle (2007) and Gayle (2013).  
 A codeshare agreement can be thought of as a privately negotiated pricing contract 
between partners      , where   is a per-passenger price the ticketing carrier pays over to an 
operating carrier for transporting the passenger, while   represents a potential lump-sum transfer 
between partners that determines how the joint surplus is distributed.  For the purposes of this 
paper it is not necessary to econometrically identify an equilibrium value of  . 
 Let the final price of a product that involves codesharing be determined within a 
sequential price-setting game, where in the first stage of the sequential process an operating 
carrier sets price,  , for transporting a passenger using its own plane(s), and privately makes this 
price known to its partner ticketing carrier.  In the second stage, conditional on the agreed-upon 
price   for services supplied by the operating carrier, the ticketing carrier sets the final round-
trip price    for the product.  The final subgame in this sequential price-setting game is played 
between ticketing carriers, and produces the final ticket prices observed by consumers and us the 
researchers. 
 Let each ticketing carrier, denoted by f, offer to consumers a set of products, denoted by 
  .  Thus, ticketing carrier f in market m sets final prices for these products according to the 
following optimization problem: 
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            *∑                +       (5) 
 
where  *∑                + is variable profit carrier f obtains in the market by offering the set 
of products    to consumers,    is the price of product j,     is the effective combined marginal 
cost ticketing carrier f incurs by offering product j and    is the quantity sold of product j.   
 Let   indexes operating carriers, and    be the set of operating carriers that use their own 
planes to provide transportation services to product j.  The effective combined marginal cost of 
product j is given by       
  ∑   
 
     .    
 
 is the part of the effective combined marginal 
cost that ticketing carrier   incurs by using its own plane to provide transportation services on 
some segment(s) of the trip needed for product  .  If ticketing carrier   does not provide 
transportation service on any segment of the trip, then   
   .     
  is the price ticketing carrier 
  pays to operating carrier   for its transportation service on the trip segment(s) that use(s) 
plane(s) owned by operating carrier  . 
 Since in equilibrium quantity of product j demanded is equal to quantity supplied, i.e. 
     , then we can replace    in the optimization in (5) with the expression on the right-hand-
side of the demand equation in (4). Therefore, across all carriers indexed by f in a given 
market, the optimization problem in (5) yields the following J first-order conditions: 
 
 ∑          
   
   
           for all j = 1,…,J    (6) 
 
where    is the subset of products in the market that are offered to consumers by airline f.  The 
system of first-order conditions represented by equation (6) can be rewritten in matrix notation as 
the following: 
 
                            (7) 
 
where p is a     vector of product prices, mc is a     vector of marginal costs, s is a     
vector of predicted product shares, Ω is a     matrix of zeros and ones appropriately positioned 
to capture ticketing carriers' "ownership" structure of the J products in a market, and Δ is a      
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matrix of first-order own-price and cross-price effects, where element     
   
   
.  Note, the 
operator    represents element-by-element multiplication of two matrices.  
 A convenient feature of representing the first-order conditions using matrix notion is that 
the structure of matrix  in equation (7) effectively determines groups of products in a market 
that are jointly priced.  For example, if the distinct ticketing carriers that offer products to 
consumers in a market non-cooperatively set their product prices, then the structure of  is 
simply determined by    for all f in the market.  On the other hand, if subsets of these ticketing 
carriers are ATI partners and therefore jointly/cooperatively set prices in a given market, then the 
structure of  is based on product-groupings according to subsets of ATI partners instead of   .  
We will subsequently exploit this convenient feature of matrix  to analyze price-setting 
behavior of ATI partner carriers in their carve-out markets.  
 Equation (7) can be used to calculate a     vector of product markups as follows: 
 
                                              (8) 
 
Additionally, with computed product markups in hand, product marginal costs can subsequently 
be recovered simply by subtracting computed markup from price, i.e.   ̂          .  
 
 1.5 Estimation and Results 
 Demand Estimation 
 As shown in Berry (1994), the following linear equation specification can be used to 
estimate the parameters in the nested logit demand model: 
 
   (    )                
            (      )      ,   (9) 
 
where      is the observed market share of the product,      is the observed market share of the 
outside good, and        is the observed within group share of the product.  The estimation of 
equation (9) needs to take into account the potential endogeneity of      and       . 
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 Instruments  
 Valid instruments will be correlated with      and       , but uncorrelated with     .  
The instruments used in demand estimation are: (1) the number of other products in the market 
with an equivalent number of coupon segments on the going (coming) portion of the itinerary, 
where these other competing products are not offered by the airline that offers the product for 
which the instrument variable value is computed; (2) the total number of miles flown on the 
going (coming) portion of the itinerary; and (3) the deviation of a product‟s itinerary flying 
distance-based routing quality measure from the mean routing quality measure across the set of 
products offered by the ticketing carrier.
10
  (1) and (2) instrument for price, while (3) instruments 
for the within group share. 
 The instruments for price stem from the fact that price is composed of a markup and 
marginal cost component.  Instrument (1) serves as a measure of the level of competition a 
product faces in the market; thus, affecting the product‟s markup.  Instrument (2) follows from 
the idea that flying distance is likely to be correlated with the product‟s marginal cost.  
Following arguments in Chen and Gayle (2014), the use of instrument (3) stems from the idea 
that, all else equal, consumers prefer the product with the most direct routing, i.e. highest routing 
quality measure, between the origin and destination.  Since the demand model groups products 
by airlines, which defines how within group product shares are computed, the rationale for the 
instrument is that the lower (greater) the product's routing quality relative to the mean routing 
quality across products offered by the airline in the market, then the lower (greater) will be the 
product's within group share.  Thus, the instrument is likely to be correlated with the product‟s 
within group share. 
 The arguments made in the previous two paragraphs provide reasons to believe that our 
instruments are likely correlated with the endogenous variables.  However, it is also important 
that the instruments are unlikely to be correlated with the shocks to demand captured by     . 
For the latter property of our instruments we rely on the fact that the menu of products offered by 
                                                 
10
 For cases in which the routing quality is equal to the mean routing quality of all products offered by the carrier, 
the deviation of routing quality instrument variable is constructed to take the maximum value of the routing quality 
measure of 100. 
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airlines in a market is predetermined at the time of shocks to demand.  Furthermore, unlike price 
and within group product share, the menu of products offered and their associated non-price 
characteristics are not routinely and easily changed during a short period of time, which 
mitigates the influence of demand shocks on the menu of products offered and their non-price 
characteristics.  Therefore, a product's itinerary flying distance and its routing quality measure 
are predetermined during the short-run period of price-setting by airlines and product choice by 
passengers, which makes these valid non-price product characteristics to use for constructing 
instruments. 
 
 Results from Demand Estimation 
 Table 1.3 reports ordinary least squares (OLS) and two-stage least squares (2SLS) 
methods of estimating coefficients in the demand model.  The coefficient estimates on      and 
           are consistent with economic theory, but are very different in magnitude across the 
two methods of estimation.  A Wu-Hausman test is performed to examine the endogeneity of 
     and           .  The Wu-Hausman test result is reported in the last row of Table 1.3 and 
provides strong evidence of the endogeneity of      and           .  Thus, instruments must be 
used.   
As a check on the statistical power of instruments to explain variations in the endogenous 
variables, we perform nested likelihood ratio tests.  Using OLS, each endogenous variable is first 
regressed against the exogenous variables, which serve as the restricted specifications in the 
nested likelihood ratio tests.  Second, for the unrestricted specifications in the nested likelihood 
ratio tests, each endogenous variable is regressed against the exogenous variables and the 
instruments.  The χ2 test statistics regarding the joint significance of the instruments in 
explaining variations in      and            are 7,777.92 and 477,883.53, respectively, where 
each is statistically significant at the 1% level.  Thus, the instruments do have power in 
explaining variations in the endogenous variables. 
 In light of the Wu-Hausman test results, we focus subsequent discussion on the 2SLS 
regression estimates.  Consistent with economic theory, the coefficient estimate on price is 
negative.  An increase in price lowers the utility of consumers, all else constant.  Additionally, 
note the statistical significance of coefficient estimate on            suggests that consumers 
 19 
have greater preference for the set of products offered by a given carrier.  This provides evidence 
that consumers exhibit some brand loyalty to a particular carrier. 
 The coefficient estimate on Opres is positive.  Therefore, the more destinations a 
particular carrier offers service to, the greater the utility of the consumer, all else constant.  This 
is consistent with the idea that consumers have a preference for a particular carrier.  Consumers 
within a market will want to reap the rewards of any frequent-flier programs offered by a 
particular carrier.  Thus, the more destinations the carrier offers services to, the consumer can use 
that particular carrier to travel and obtain the frequent-flier rewards.  This is consistent with the 
idea that consumers exhibit brand loyalty. 
 The coefficient estimates for Nonstop_going and Nonstop_coming are each positive.  All 
else constant, utility is greater using nonstop products versus products that require intermediate 
stop(s).  As expected, the evidence suggests that, on average, passengers view intermediate stops 
as travel inconveniences.  The positive coefficient estimates on Route_qual_going and 
Route_qual_coming support this argument and go a step further to suggest that among products 
with equivalent number of intermediate stops, passengers prefer the product with the most direct 
routing (higher measures of Route_qual_going and Route_qual_coming) between the origin and 
destination, all else constant. 
 Regarding the coefficient estimates on the codeshare variables, first consider 
Trad_1_going and Trad_1_coming.  These negative coefficient estimates imply that codeshare 
products, where the ticketing carrier operates at least one coupon segment, are less preferred to 
pure online products, all else constant.  Additionally, the coefficient estimates on Trad_2_going 
and Trad_2_coming are negative as well.  All else constant, a codeshare product for which the 
ticketing carrier is not an operating carrier, and the consumer is required to switch carriers at 
some point during their travel, lowers the utility of the consumer.  Switching carriers is an 
inconvenience for the consumer.  It is worth noting that the magnitude of the coefficient 
estimates for Trad_1_going and Trad_1_coming are smaller than that of Trad_2_going and 
Trad_2_coming, suggesting that products where the ticketing carrier operates on a portion of the 
itinerary are preferred to products where the ticketing carrier does not operate on a portion of the 
itinerary.  Since the consumer purchased the ticket from the ticketing carrier, this provides 
evidence that consumers have a preference for the carrier with which they interact when 
purchasing the travel ticket. 
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Table 1.3 Demand Estimation Results 
(2005Q1 - 2010Q4) 
  OLS 2SLS 
Variable Estimates Std. Error Estimates Std. Error 
Real_price -0.00002*** (5.22e-7) -0.00214*** (0.00003) 
ln(Sjmt/g) 0.40303*** (0.00061) 0.16484*** (0.00262) 
Opres 0.00501*** (0.00002) 0.00629*** (0.00008) 
Nonstop_going 0.80914*** (0.00434) 0.76043*** (0.00870) 
Nonstop_coming 0.80146*** (0.00443) 0.75636*** (0.00895) 
Route_qual_going 0.00786*** (0.00008) 0.00895*** (0.00018) 
Route_qual_coming 0.00730*** (0.00008) 0.00870*** (0.00018) 
Trad_1_going -0.25311*** (0.00180) -0.04971*** (0.00696) 
Trad_2_going -0.32409*** (0.01270) -0.18513*** (0.04399) 
Trad_1_coming -0.23605*** (0.00171) -0.03632*** (0.00683) 
Trad_2_coming -0.27768*** (0.01021) -0.08736*** (0.04105) 
Virtual_going -0.48041*** (0.00459) -0.44063*** (0.01190) 
Virtual_coming -0.47594*** (0.00417) -0.22349*** (0.01243) 
Constant -8.58837*** (0.19404) -6.51280*** (0.80244) 
Ticketing carrier FE Yes Yes 
Origin FE Yes Yes 
Destination FE Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes 
Quarter FE Yes Yes 
Obs 1,791,108 1,791,108 
R
2
 0.7722 0.6978 
Wu-Hausman (χ2)   94,076.8*** 
*indicates significance at the 10% level, **indicates significance at the 5% level  
and ***indicates significance at the 1% level. 
 
 The coefficient estimates on Virtual_going and Virtual_coming are negative as well.  
Thus, all else constant, utility is lower with virtual codeshare products versus pure online 
products.  The evidence therefore suggests that consumers view virtual codeshare products as 
inferior substitutes to pure online products. 
 The coefficient estimates of the demand model yield a mean own-price elasticity of -2.30.    
This estimate of the own-price elasticity is similar to what has been found in U.S. domestic air 
travel markets.  For instance, recent estimates of the own-price elasticity by Peters (2006) are in 
the -3.20 to -3.60 range, while Berry and Jia (2010) estimate own-price elasticities to be in the 
range of about -1.89 to -2.10. 
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 1.6 Results from Assessing Cooperative Behavior in Carve-out Markets  
 Non-nested Likelihood Ratio Test 
 With the demand parameter estimates in hand, equation (8) can now be used to compute 
markups and subsequently recover marginal costs.  However, depending on the structure of 
matrix, Ω, various estimates of markups and marginal costs can be obtained.  In our analysis we 
define Ω in two ways to denote two different scenarios that we consider.  In one scenario, we 
construct Ωcoop assuming the carriers that have been given ATI cooperate in setting prices in all 
markets.  In other words, we are assuming here that ATI partners jointly set prices of their 
products in a given market.  In another scenario, we construct Ωcoop_nc assuming carriers that 
have been given ATI cooperate in all markets except markets in which a carve-out is present.  
Thus, ATI partners jointly set prices for their products in markets where they each offer 
products, but non-cooperatively set prices for their products in markets in which there is a carve-
out.  As a result, we obtain two sets of markup and marginal cost estimates with the purpose of 
using non-nested statistical tests to uncover which of the two sets is better statistically supported 
in carve-out markets. 
 Upon recovering the two respective sets of marginal cost estimates, we estimate the 
following reduced-form marginal cost functions using OLS: 
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, respectively.      is a vector of marginal cost shifters, which include a 
constant term, MC_opres, MC_opres
2
, Nonstop_going, Nonstop_coming, Itinerary_dist_going, 
Itinerary_dist_coming, Trad_1_going, Trad_1_coming, Trad_2_going, Trad_2_coming, 
Virtual_going and Virtual_coming, all of which have been previously described.  Since the 
purpose is to examine the behavior of carriers in carve-out markets, we estimate these marginal 
cost equations on subsamples of data from the respective carriers‟ carve-out markets.  The 
subsamples consist of all products in carve-out markets in which the respective carriers each 
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offer products.  Parameter estimates for equations (10) and (11) are reported in Table A.3, Table 
A.4, Table A.5 and Table A.6, all located  in the appendix. 
 We use a Vuong (1989) non-nested likelihood ratio test to statistically compare the two 
non-nested model specifications in equations (10) and (11).  The test statistic for the non-nested 
tests, t, is calculated as follows: 
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where  ̂ and  ̂ are the parameter estimates from the two respective models;         ̂  and 
          ̂  are the log-likelihood function values for the two respective models; n is the number 
of observations; and  ̂ is the standard deviation of the differences in the log-likelihood functions. 
The test statistic is asymptotically normally distributed.  Given a critical value, c, the null 
hypothesis is that the two models are equivalent.  We reject the null hypothesis if t > +c or t < -c.  
In the case that t > +c, then the data better support the model in which the respective ATI 
partners cooperate in all markets.  In the case that t < -c, then the data better support the model in 
which the ATI partners cooperate in all markets except the carve-out markets. 
 Table 1.4 summarizes the results from the analysis.  The competing models of price-
setting behavior are not statistically different from each other when estimated on the separate 
carve-out markets subsamples for the American/LAN, Delta/Air France and United/Air Canada 
partner pairings.  However, in the combined carve-out markets subsample we reject the null 
hypothesis that the competing models are statistically equivalent in favor of the model in which 
the ATI partners jointly set their prices in carve-out markets.  Thus, there is some evidence that 
tacit collusion may be occurring in carve-out markets. 
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Table 1.4 Non-nested Test Statistics from Carve-out Market Subsamples 
 AA/LA 
Carve-out 
Market(s) 
DL/AF 
Carve-out 
Market(s) 
UA/AC 
Carve-out 
Market(s) 
Combined Sample of 
Carve-out Markets 
Test statistic, t -0.9719 0.2303 0.2077 2.2204** 
Observations, n 191 894 435 1,520 
*indicates significance at the 10% level, **indicates significance at the 5% level and 
***indicates significance at the 1% level (2 tail test). 
 
 Reduced-form Markup Equation Estimation 
 In order to further examine the effects of a carve-out, or how the carriers are behaving in 
carve-out markets, we first identify markets in which the ATI partners in question each offer 
products, i.e. the set of markets in which their air travel services overlap.  Typically the 
designated carve-out markets are a subset of the overlap markets for a given ATI partner pairing.  
Therefore, identifying these overlap markets allow us to compare the markups, marginal costs 
and prices for the partner carriers in carve-out markets versus non-carve-out markets.  The 
markup, marginal cost and price regressions are estimated using four subsamples consisting of 
the aforementioned markets.  There is a subsample consisting of markets in which AA and LA 
each offer products, a subsample consisting of markets in which DL and AF each offer products, 
a subsample consisting of markets in which UA and AC each offer products, and a subsample 
consisting of the combination of each of the three subsamples.  Given the results found in the 
previous sub-section, we focus on results using the markup and marginal cost estimates under the 
assumption that the ATI partners in question are cooperating in all markets in which they each 
offer products. 
 The markup regression used in the analysis has the following specification: 
 
          ̂   
                                                      
                            
      
,       (13) 
 
where      is a vector consisting of the following: a constant, Opres, Nonstop_going, 
Nonstop_coming, Route_qual_going, Route_qual_coming, Trad_1_going, Trad_1_coming, 
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Trad_2_going, Trad_2_coming, Virtual_going and Virtual_coming which have been previously 
described. 
 The primary variables of interest are: AA/LA_market_co, AA/LA_product and 
AA/LA_product_co.  AA/LA_market_co is a zero-one market-level dummy variable that takes the 
value of one for all products in a market designated as a carve-out market for ATI partners AA 
and LA.  AA/LA_product is a zero-one product-level dummy variable that takes a value of one 
only for AA and LA products in a market in which AA and LA each offer products.  
AA/LA_product_co is effectively the interaction between AA/LA_market_co and AA/LA_product, 
i.e., AA/LA_product_co is a zero-one product-level dummy variable that takes a value of one 
only for AA and LA products offered in their carve-out market (i.e. their products that were 
subject to a carve-out).  Similarly, DL/AF_product, DL/AF_product_co, DL/AF_market_co, 
UA/AC_product, UA/AC_product_co and UA/AC_market_co dummy variables are created for 
the DL/AF and UA/AC pairings, respectively, to facilitate estimating equations analogous to 
equation (13) for each of these other ATI partner pairings.  The parameter λ1 illustrates the 
systematic differences on markups for products in the ATI partners' carve-out markets relative to 
their non-carve-out markets.  Parameter λ2 illustrates the systematic differences in markups of the 
ATI partners' products relative to the markups of competitors‟ products.  Parameter λ3 provides a 
way to compare the markups of the ATI partners' products in their carve-out markets versus their 
non-carve-out markets.  Specifically, λ3 tells us how the markups of the ATI partners‟ products 
relative to competitors‟ products differ between carve-out and non-carve-out markets. 
 
 Construction of Instruments for Markup Equation Estimation 
 A variable of concern in equation (13), as well as its counterpart in the equations 
analogous to equation (13) is, AA/LA_market_co.  The concern is that this variable may be 
endogenous.  Consider the following: carve-out markets are chosen to be carve-out markets by 
the DOT based on the competitive characteristics of the market.  So the competitive 
characteristics of a market jointly determine product markup levels and the policy designation of 
the market to be a carve-out for the relevant ATI partners.  Given the potential endogeneity of 
this variable, we use a two-stage instrumental variables procedure (Two-stage IV) to estimate the 
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aforementioned specification.  Likewise, the variable AA/LA_product_co is potentially 
endogenous as it is a function of AA/LA_market_co. 
 In order to construct the instruments, data from the International Passenger Origin and 
Destination survey for the two years prior to the respective carriers obtaining ATI are compiled.  
In the case of AA/LA, data from the third quarter of 1997 through the second quarter of 1999 are 
used.  Similarly, the construction of instruments for DL/AF and UA/AC use data from the fourth 
quarter of 1999 through the third quarter of 2001 and the third quarter of 1995 through the 
second quarter of 1997, respectively.  Only observations in which the origin is the U.S. and the 
destination is a foreign country are analyzed. 
 Using the pre-ATI period data, a logit estimation is conducted on the following equation: 
 
                                                      .  (14) 
 
AA/LA_carveout is a dummy variable equal to one for origin and destination combination(s) in 
which AA and LA are subject to a carve-out and zero otherwise.  AA/LA_market is a dummy 
variable equal to one if AA and LA each operate non-stop service in the market.  AA/LA_share is 
a variable that measures the share of passengers in a given market who fly on AA and LA 
nonstop products, where AA and LA each operate substitutable nonstop products in these 
markets. 
11
  The logit model in (14) is the first-stage regression in the two-stage instrumental 
variables estimation process.  Therefore, AA/LA_market and AA/LA_share are effectively used as 
instruments to explain the DOT policymaking designation of carve-out markets, based on data 
leading up to the carve-out designation.  The first-stage regression specification in equation (14) 
is essentially approximating the policymaking decision process of the DOT.  Analogous 
estimations are done for the DL/AF and UA/AC carve-out designations. 
The rationale for the instrument variables AA/LA_market and AA/LA_share is that carve-
out markets are likely designated as carve-out markets by the DOT based on the level of 
competition the DOT observes in the market leading up to its decision.  If the ATI partners face 
little or no competition from other carriers in the market, then cooperation between the ATI 
                                                 
11
 Note that variable AA/LA_share is constructed to take on a value of zero in markets where AA and LA do not 
provide overlapping nonstop service. 
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partners is likely to have a greater anticompetitive impact.  The ATI partners' markets where they 
each offer non-stop service and face relatively weak competition from other carriers (i.e. where 
the ATI partners‟ nonstop service constitute a large share of the market), are markets that should 
have a relatively high probability of being designated a carve-out by the DOT. 
 Upon estimating (14), the fitted values for AA/LA_carveout are obtained, which we 
denote as               ̂ .12  These fitted values calculated using pre-ATI period information 
are then used to instrument for AA/LA_market_co in the markup equation estimation, which 
constitutes the second-stage of the two-stage estimation.  Similarly, the interaction term between 
AA/LA_product and               ̂  is used to instrument for AA/LA_product_co.  Analogous 
methods are used to create instruments in the case of DL/AF and UA/AC. 
 Table 1.5 reports estimation results of equation (14).  The results indicate that markets in 
which the prospective ATI partners each offer nonstop products are more likely to be designated 
as carve-out markets.  This is evident by the positive coefficient estimates on AA/LA_market, 
DL/AF_market and UA/AC_market.  Furthermore, the coefficient estimates on DL/AF_share and 
UA/AC_share are positive.  Thus, the greater the proportion of passengers travelling in the 
market using the prospective ATI partners‟ nonstop products, the more likely the market is to be 
designated a carve-out market. 
 
Table 1.5 First-stage Logit Estimation Results 
  AA/LA_carveout DL/AF_carveout UA/AC_carveout 
Variable Estimates Std. Error Estimates Std. Error Estimates Std. Error 
AA/LA_market  10.16*** (1.03) - - - - 
AA/LA_share   -1.05 (0.99) - - - - 
DL/AF_market - -    7.54*** (0.99) - - 
DL/AF_share - -    8.16*** (2.03) - - 
UA/AC_market - - - -    9.56*** (0.79) 
UA/AC_share - - - -    1.19* (0.67) 
Constant -10.97*** (0.50) -11.70*** (0.71) -11.50*** (0.71) 
Observations 231,297 240,790 198,238 
Pseudo-R
2
 0.3579 0.7653 0.6336 
*indicates significance at the 10% level, **indicates significance at the 5% level  
                                                 
12
               ̂  is origin/destination specific and is calculated by averaging the fitted values from (14) for a 
given origin/destination over time.  This must be done since an origin/destination may be present among the two 
years and the origin/destination may take on a different fitted value in each quarter based on the value of the 
independent variables in the quarter. 
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and ***indicates significance at the 1% level. 
 
 Inferences from Markup Equation Estimation 
 Table 1.6 and Table 1.7 report the OLS and Two-stage IV markup equation estimation 
results, respectively.  The results of a Wu-Hausman test suggest the suspected endogenous 
variables are indeed endogenous in each subsample.  In most cases, the Two-stage IV results 
regarding the signs and statistical significance of the coefficient estimates are qualitatively 
similar to the OLS results.  The difference between the OLS and Two-stage IV results can be 
seen in the magnitude of some coefficient estimates.  Thus, for brevity the following discussion 
focuses on the Two-stage IV results. 
 First, consider the coefficient estimate on Opres.  The coefficient estimate is consistently 
positive and statistically significant across each of the subsamples.  Therefore, all else constant, 
the greater the presence a carrier has at the origin airport of a market, the larger the carrier‟s 
markups on its products in this market.  This result is consistent with economic intuition since a 
carrier offering products to many destinations from a given airport is likely to attract a relatively 
larger following of brand-loyal consumers, perhaps reinforced by the carrier's frequent flyer 
program, which in turn allows the carrier to charge a larger markup on its products going out of 
this airport. 
 The results in each subsample suggest that markups are greater on nonstop products, all 
else constant.  If consumers view intermediate stops as travel-inconveniences, as suggested by 
our demand model estimates, then carriers will have the ability to sustain larger markups on 
products without any intermediate stops.  The coefficient estimates on our measure of itinerary 
routing quality, however, are mixed.  The coefficient estimate for Route_qual_going is positive 
as expected in the DL/AF subsample.  The positive coefficient estimate says that the greater the 
routing quality of the going portion of the itinerary, the higher the markup charged by the carrier, 
all else constant.  This is consistent with the idea that consumers prefer streamlined travel and 
are not willing to pay more for travel that uses inconvenient routing.  However, the coefficient 
estimate for Route_qual_going in the UA/AC subsample is negative.  The coefficient estimates 
for Route_qual_coming are mixed across each of the subsamples.  In the DL/AF subsample, the 
coefficient estimate is not statistically significant, but negative in each of the other subsamples.   
 28 
 In each of the three subsamples there is strong evidence that, all else constant, a product's 
markup will be lower the greater the number of comparable competing products it faces in the 
market.  This is evident by the negative coefficient estimates on Close_comp_going and/or 
Close_comp_coming, respectively. 
 The coefficient estimates for the virtual codeshare variables are consistently negative 
across each of the subsamples.  Thus, all else constant, markups are lower on virtual codeshare 
products relative to pure online products.  This provides support for the argument that consumers 
exhibit brand loyalty and would prefer to fly with the carrier from which they purchased the 
itinerary.   
 In comparing traditional codeshare products to otherwise equivalent pure online products, 
there are theoretical arguments that can support the size of markup being larger on any one of 
these product types compared to the other.  For instance, Gayle (2013) has argued and shown, as 
have the demand results in this paper, that all else equal, consumers prefer to fly on a pure online 
product compared to a traditional codeshare product.  This suggests that in equilibrium airlines 
should charge a larger markup on pure online products compared to otherwise equivalent 
codeshare products.  However, Gayle (2013) and Ito and Lee (2007) also argue that while 
traditional codesharing reduces double markup, double markup may not be fully eliminated 
between partner carriers.  Since a pure online product cannot have double markup due to a single 
carrier being responsible for all aspects of providing the product, then an otherwise equivalent 
traditional codeshare product should have a larger markup.   
 Based on the previous discussion, not surprisingly the markup results regarding 
traditional codeshare products compared to pure online products are mixed.  For instance, in the 
DL/AF subsample, the coefficient estimates for variables Trad_1_going, Trad_1_coming, and 
Trad_2_going are each positive signifying that markups are higher on traditionally codeshared 
products, all else constant.  The analogous coefficient estimates in the UA/AC subsample are not 
statistically different from zero with the exception of Trad_2_coming in which the coefficient is 
negative.  In the AA/LA subsample the coefficient estimate for Trad_2_going is negative.  
However, the coefficient estimates for Trad_1_going, Trad_1_coming and Trad_2_coming are 
each positive.  In the combined sample the coefficient estimate on Trad_1_going and 
Trad_2_coming are negative, while the coefficient estimates for Trad_1_coming and 
Trad_2_going are not statistically significant. 
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Table 1.6 Markup Regression Estimates on Subsamples of Markets with Partner Service Overlap (OLS) 
  
Combined sample markets with  
AA/LA, DL/AF or UA/AC  
service overlap 
Subsample markets with 
AA/LA service overlap 
Subsample markets with 
 DL/AF service overlap 
Subsample markets with 
UA/AC service overlap 
Variable Est. Std. Error Est. Std. Error Est. Std. Error Est. Std. Error 
Opres    0.03*** (6.58e-4)     0.01*** (2.22e-3)     0.02*** (6.70e-4)     0.02*** (2.31e-3) 
Nonstop_going    2.38*** (0.17)     2.27*** (0.46)     2.89*** (0.17)     2.13*** (0.52) 
Nonstop_coming    2.72*** (0.17)     2.37*** (0.47)     3.55*** (0.17)     1.70*** (0.51) 
Route_qual_going 1.01e-3 (0.01) 1.28e-3 (0.02)     0.01*** (0.01)    -0.01 (0.01) 
Route_qual_coming   -0.01** (0.01)    -0.04** (0.02)     0.01 (0.01)    -0.01 (0.01) 
Close_comp_going   -0.05*** (0.01) -1.48e-3 (0.02)    -0.03*** (0.01)    -0.10*** (0.02) 
Close_comp_coming   -0.03*** (0.01)     0.04* (0.02)    -0.02** (0.01)    -0.09*** (0.02) 
Trad_1_going   -0.02 (0.08)     0.80*** (0.25)     0.57*** (0.07)     0.07 (0.30) 
Trad_2_going    0.69 (0.54)    -2.37*** (0.83)     1.52*** (0.43)   13.68 (10.36) 
Trad_1_coming    0.01 (0.07)     0.52** (0.25)     0.49*** (0.07)    -0.21 (0.27) 
Trad_2_coming   -0.69** (0.28)     2.56** (1.29)     0.25 (0.28)    -3.87*** (1.11) 
Virtual_going   -1.23*** (0.13)    -1.19*** (0.29)    -0.55*** (0.12)    -0.26 (0.37) 
Virtual_coming   -1.23*** (0.12)    -0.68** (0.30)    -0.59*** (0.12)    -0.58* (0.32) 
AA/LA_market_co -16.42*** (1.09)   -17.35*** (1.21) - - - - 
AA/LA_product    3.63*** (0.22)     5.37*** (0.53) - - - - 
AA/LA_product_co    4.75*** (0.41)     6.28*** (0.73) - - - - 
DL/AF_market_co   -2.97*** (0.21) - -    -3.39*** (0.22) - - 
DL/AF_product   -0.86*** (0.18) - -     1.26*** (0.06) - - 
DL/AF_product_co   13.89*** (0.38) - -   14.13*** (0.38) - - 
UA/AC_market_co    -2.92*** (0.28) - - - -    -0.41 (0.68) 
UA/AC_product     3.72*** (0.33) - - - -     4.51*** (0.31) 
UA/AC_product_co     3.86*** (0.37) - - - -     2.80*** (0.53) 
Constant 460.32*** (1.36) 455.40*** (2.22) 456.50 (0.87) 473.17*** (1.47) 
Obs 60,971 5,356 43,329 12,331 
R
2
 0.4414  0.5389 0.4719 0.4650 
*indicates significance at the 10% level, **indicates significance at the 5% level and ***indicates significance at the 1% level. 
Quarter, year, ticketing carrier, origin and destination fixed effects are included. 
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Table 1.7 Markup Regression Estimates on Subsamples of Markets with Partner Service Overlap (Two-stage IV) 
  
Combined sample markets with  
AA/LA, DL/AF or UA/AC  
service overlap 
Subsample markets with 
AA/LA service overlap 
Subsample markets with 
 DL/AF service overlap 
Subsample markets with 
UA/AC service overlap 
Variable Est. Std. Error Est. Std. Error Est. Std. Error Est. Std. Error 
Opres     0.03*** (6.85e-4)    0.01*** (2.21e-3)     0.02*** (7.15e-4)     0.02*** (2.44e-3) 
Nonstop_going     2.16*** (0.18)    2.51*** (0.46)     2.46*** (0.18)     2.23*** (0.53) 
Nonstop_coming     2.45*** (0.18)    2.60*** (0.48)     3.06*** (0.18)     1.80*** (0.52) 
Route_qual_going -2.69e-3 (0.01) 3.58e-3 (0.02)     0.01* (0.01)    -0.02** (0.01) 
Route_qual_coming    -0.02*** (0.01)   -0.04** (0.02) 3.13e-3 (0.01)    -0.02** (0.01) 
Close_comp_going    -0.04*** (0.01)    0.01 (0.02)    -0.03*** (0.01)    -0.10*** (0.02) 
Close_comp_coming    -0.02*** (0.01)    0.04** (0.02)    -0.01 (0.01)    -0.09*** (0.02) 
Trad_1_going    -0.16** (0.08)    0.77*** (0.25)     0.35*** (0.07)     0.10 (0.30) 
Trad_2_going     0.65 (0.54)   -2.45*** (0.83)     1.34*** (0.44)   14.23 (10.07) 
Trad_1_coming    -0.12 (0.08)    0.50** (0.25)     0.31*** (0.07)    -0.23 (0.28) 
Trad_2_coming    -0.69** (0.28)    2.53* (1.29)     0.14 (0.28)    -3.81*** (1.08) 
Virtual_going    -1.34*** (0.13)   -1.14*** (0.29)    -0.69*** (0.13)    -0.53 (0.39) 
Virtual_coming    -1.35*** (0.13)   -0.65* (0.30)    -0.77*** (0.13)    -0.59* (0.34) 
AA/LA_market_co  -12.65*** (1.68)  -14.01*** (1.67) - - - - 
AA/LA_product     3.84*** (0.22)     5.50*** (0.53) - - - - 
AA/LA_product_co     1.19 (1.35)     1.68 (1.53) - - - - 
DL/AF_market_co    -1.65*** (0.38) - -    -2.92*** (0.41) - - 
DL/AF_product    -1.04*** (0.18) - -     1.09*** (0.06) - - 
DL/AF_product_co   27.36*** (1.04) - -   28.36*** (1.04) - - 
UA/AC_market_co    -0.47 (0.66) - - - -     9.32*** (1.48) 
UA/AC_product     3.53*** (0.34) - - - -     4.20*** (0.33) 
UA/AC_product_co   10.13*** (1.24) - - - -   10.34*** (1.48) 
Constant 462.82*** (1.26) 454.86*** (2.23) 458.54*** (0.80) 475.57*** (1.46) 
Obs 60,971 5,356 43,329 12,331 
R
2
 0.4136 0.5376 0.4294 0.4322 
Wu-Hausman (χ2) 465.438*** 25.461*** 343.513*** 196.529*** 
*indicates significance at the 10% level, **indicates significance at the 5% level and ***indicates significance at the 1% level. 
Quarter, year, ticketing carrier, origin and destination fixed effects are included. 
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 Turning attention to the key variables of interest, we find that results for these key 
variables in the combined sample are consistent with the results in the smaller subsamples.  
Thus, for brevity, we focus the subsequent discussion on results from the combined sample.  
Consider the negative coefficient estimates on variables AA/LA_market_co and 
DL/AF_market_co.  This indicates that, on average, product markups are lower in each of these 
ATI partner parings' carve-out markets compared to their non-carve-out markets.  However, the 
coefficient estimate on UA/AC_market_co is not statistically significant in the combined sample, 
but positive in the UA/AC subsample.  Therefore, there is some evidence that markups on 
products in UA/AC carve-out markets are higher on average compared to their non-carve-out 
markets. 
 The coefficient estimate regarding AA/LA_product is positive.  Therefore, all else 
constant, AA and LA products have higher markups on average compared to non-AA and non-
LA products in their non-carve-out markets.  The same result holds for UA and AC products.  In 
the case of DL and AF, the analogous coefficient estimate suggests in contrast that on average 
DL and AF products have lower markups than competitors‟ products in their non-carve-out 
markets, all else constant.  Note however, that in the DL/AF subsample this coefficient estimate 
is positive. 
 In order to compare the markups of products offered by the partner carriers in their carve-
out versus non-carve-out markets, which is the comparison most relevant for the primary 
objective of our analysis, we must turn to the coefficient estimates on AA/LA_product_co, 
DL/AF_product_co and UA/AC_product_co, respectively.  The carve-out policy is meant to 
restrict cooperative pricing between ATI partners in those particular carve-out markets.  In the 
absence of cooperation, the two respective carriers would compete with each other in the market.  
Thus, if the ATI partners are competing in their carve-out markets as required by antitrust 
authorities, one would expect the coefficient estimates of AA/LA_product_co, 
DL/AF_product_co and UA/AC_product_co to be negative, indicating that their products have 
relatively lower markups in their carve-out markets compared to their non-carve-out markets, all 
else constant.  In other words, one would expect the extent to which ATI partners are marking up 
products relative to competitors‟ product markups to be lower in their designated cave-out 
markets.  However, the coefficient estimate on DL/AF_product_co is positive, indicating that on 
average DL and AF products have relatively higher markups in their carve-out markets, all else 
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constant.  The same result holds true regarding UA and AC.  On the other hand, the coefficient 
estimate regarding AA/LA_product_co is not statistically significant, indicating that AA and LA 
products have the same relative markups in their carve-out markets and non-carve-out markets, 
all else constant.  In other words, AA and LA are marking up products in their carve-out markets 
no differently than products in non-carve-out markets.  Therefore, contrary to the objective of the 
carve-out policy, the evidence suggests that tacit collusion between ATI partners is occurring in 
their carve-out markets. 
 
 Inferences from Marginal Cost Function Estimation 
 To provide further insights into the effects a carve-out policy has on partner carriers in 
their carve-out markets, we estimate the following specification of the marginal cost function: 
 
      ̂   
                                                  
                           
          (15) 
 
where      ̂  is recovered product-level marginal cost estimates from the Nash first-order 
conditions in equation (7), and      is a vector of marginal cost shifters as defined in section 
1.6.  The variables AA/LA_market_co, AA/LA_product and AA/LA_product_co are also as 
previously defined.  Similar models are estimated within each of the other subsamples.  As in the 
markup regression, there are concerns over the potential endogeneity of AA/LA_market_co, 
DL/AF_market_co and UA/AC_market_co.  Therefore the marginal cost equations are also 
estimated using the Two-stage IV estimator, where the first-stage regression equation is the 
previously discussed equation (14). 
 The marginal cost equation estimation results are reported in Table 1.9.  The Wu-
Hausman test indicates that we can reject the null hypothesis that the variables are exogenous in 
three of the four subsamples.  Given these results, the discussion focuses on the Two-stage IV 
estimates. For comparison the OLS estimation results are reported in Table 1.8.  Much of the 
following discussion draws from results in the combined sample for brevity, as the qualitative 
features of the estimates are fairly consistent with the smaller subsamples. 
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 Greater origin presence increases marginal costs, but at a diminishing rate, all else 
constant.  This can be interpreted as evidence consistent with the presence of economies of 
passenger-traffic density, which implies downward pressure on an airline's marginal cost of 
transporting a passenger on a route as the volume of passengers the airline transports through the 
route increases.  The idea is that the more distinct locations that an airline has nonstop flights 
from going into the origin airport of a market (a larger origin presence measure for the airline), 
the more passengers the airline can channel through the market.   
 Estimation results from Table 1.9 also reveal that products offering nonstop service have 
higher marginal costs relative to products with an intermediate stop, all else constant.  The 
coefficient estimates on Itinerary_dist_going are not statistically significant; although, the 
coefficient estimates on Itinerary_dist_coming show the expected result that marginal cost 
increases with distance flown, all else constant.  The estimates regarding some of the traditional 
codeshare variables are not statistically significant; however, in each subsample the coefficient 
estimate is positive when statistically significant.  Thus, there is some evidence that there is a 
cost to codesharing and coordinating flights among carriers that is absent for pure online 
products.  Evidence is also present that suggests virtual codeshare products have higher marginal 
costs relative to online products, at least with regard to the coming portion of the itinerary.  
 The coefficient estimate for AA/LA_market_co suggests that marginal costs are lower on 
average for products in the AA and LA carve-out markets versus their non-carve-out markets by 
about $573, all else constant.  A similar qualitative result holds as well for DL and AF carve-out 
versus their non-carve-out markets.  Marginal costs are on average lower by about $126 in DL 
and AF carve-out markets relative to their non-carve-out markets.  In the case of UA and AC 
carve-out markets, marginal costs are not statistically different in their designated carve-out 
markets compared to their non-carve-out markets, all else constant.   
 The results also shed light on the marginal costs of products offered by these respective 
partner carriers relative to the marginal costs of products offered by other carriers in non-carve-
out markets.  The coefficient estimate for AA/LA_product is positive and statistically significant.  
All else constant, this implies that marginal costs for products offered by these partner carriers 
are higher on average than other products offered by other competitors in non-carve-out markets 
by approximately $132.  In the case of DL and AF, the results suggest that the marginal costs of 
their products are not statistically different than products offered by other carriers in these 
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partners‟ non-carve-out markets.  This is a surprising result as one may expect that full 
cooperation between carriers may generate cost efficiencies for the partner carriers such that they 
achieve lower costs than their competitors.  However, the data yield the expected cost effects 
associated with cooperation in case of the UA and AC partnership.  All else constant, the 
relevant coefficient estimate suggests that UA and AC products have lower marginal costs 
relative to competitors‟ products in non-carve-out markets by about $152. 
 Comparing the results of how partner carriers‟ products marginal costs differ in their 
carve-out versus non-carve-out markets sheds some light on the effects of a carve-out.  In the 
case of AA and LA, the coefficient estimates for AA/LA_product_co is positive.  Therefore, all 
else constant, the data implies AA and LA products have relatively higher marginal costs on 
average in their carve-out markets by approximately $536.  Consistent with a theoretical 
possibility argued in Brueckner and Proost (2010), the marginal cost results for the AA/LA ATI 
partnership suggest that the carve-out policy could be preventing a level of cooperation between 
the partner carriers that is required to generate cost efficiencies.    On the other hand, the 
coefficient on UA/AC_product_co is negative.  All else constant, the relevant coefficient estimate 
suggests that UA and AC products have relatively lower marginal costs on average in their 
carve-out markets by approximately $205.  Thus, a reasonable interpretation of this result is that 
in spite of the carve-out policy, sufficient tacit cooperation occurred between UA and AC in their 
carve-out markets that allows them to take advantage of some efficiencies and achieve lower 
costs.  The analogous estimate for DL and AF suggests relative marginal costs for their products 
in carve-out markets are no different than their products in non-carve-out markets.  This result 
could be interpreted in one of two ways.  First, the ATI partnership between DL and AF 
generated no cost efficiencies, in which case marginal costs would remain unchanged across 
their overlapping markets, regardless of the carve-out policy.  Second, cost efficiencies could be 
generated through the ATI partnership; but in spite of the carve-out policy, sufficient tacit 
cooperation is occurring that is allowing the carriers to take advantage of some cost efficiencies.   
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Table 1.8 Marginal Cost Regression Estimates on Subsamples of Markets with Partner Service Overlap (OLS) 
  
Combined sample markets with  
AA/LA, DL/AF or UA/AC  
service overlap 
Subsample markets with 
AA/LA service overlap 
Subsample markets with 
 DL/AF service overlap 
Subsample markets with 
UA/AC service overlap 
Variable Est. Std. Error Est. Std. Error Est. Std. Error Est. Std. Error 
Mc_opres      4.20*** (0.37)      8.53*** (1.41)      4.01*** (0.48)      3.06*** (0.55) 
Mc_opres
2
     -0.01*** (2.50e-3)     -0.03*** (0.01)     -0.01*** (3.03e-3)     -0.01** (4.66e-3) 
Nonstop_going    61.57*** (14.73)  124.24* (66.23)    53.46*** (19.01)    52.79** (21.65) 
Nonstop_coming  100.37*** (14.97)  104.86 (66.65)  105.63*** (19.46)    89.18*** (22.32) 
Itinerary_dist_going      0.01 (0.02) -3.32e-4 (0.04)     -0.01 (0.02)      0.01 (0.04) 
Itinerary_dist_coming      0.07*** (0.02)      0.05 (0.04)      0.04** (0.02)      0.12** (0.05) 
Trad_1_going    31.41** (13.40)  116.29** (51.34)    18.98 (16.73)    52.65*** (17.57) 
Trad_2_going     -0.52 (57.51)    65.19 (111.00)     -7.74 (63.92)    19.50 (132.91) 
Trad_1_coming    49.74*** (12.51)     -7.75 (51.72)    63.59*** (15.34)      4.29 (15.31) 
Trad_2_coming    99.82* (53.87)    40.35 (138.19)    89.97 (62.09)  205.90* (122.38) 
Virtual_going      9.00 (17.02)   -16.82 (61.45)    18.01 (22.12)      7.16 (20.49) 
Virtual_coming    91.01*** (17.24)    16.29 (62.38)   115.89*** (22.42)    37.26* (20.50) 
AA/LA_market_co -348.51** (140.26) -291.67** (140.32) - - - - 
AA/LA_product  132.59*** (31.19)  298.32* (168.33) - - - - 
AA/LA_product_co  522.45*** (148.96)  442.30*** (164.46) - - - - 
DL/AF_market_co -141.71*** (43.18) - -  -144.76*** (43.73) - - 
DL/AF_product    22.23 (18.06) - -     32.46 (27.04) - - 
DL/AF_product_co  220.03*** (71.61) - -   202.91*** (71.98) - - 
UA/AC_market_co    52.02* (28.21) - - - -    66.18** (31.51) 
UA/AC_product -155.29*** (21.68) - - - -     -5.09 (24.88) 
UA/AC_product_co   -83.67** (39.76) - - - -   -38.60 (38.62) 
Constant  833.02*** (294.83) -136.36 (319.69) 1,132.21 (327.13) -155.48 (136.41) 
Obs 60,971 5,356 43,329 12,331 
R
2
 0.1792 0.1721 0.1242 0.2013 
*indicates significance at the 10% level, **indicates significance at the 5% level and ***indicates significance at the 1% level. 
Quarter, year, operating carrier, origin and destination fixed effects are included. 
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Table 1.9 Marginal Cost Regression Estimates on Subsamples of Markets with Partner Service Overlap (Two-stage IV) 
  
Combined sample markets with  
AA/LA, DL/AF or UA/AC  
service overlap 
Subsample markets with 
AA/LA service overlap 
Subsample markets with 
 DL/AF service overlap 
Subsample markets with 
UA/AC service overlap 
Variable Est. Std. Error Est. Std. Error Est. Std. Error Est. Std. Error 
Mc_opres      4.21*** (0.37)       8.49*** (1.40) 3.97*** (0.48)      3.26*** (0.54) 
Mc_opres
2
     -0.01*** (2.52e-3)      -0.03*** (0.01) -0.01*** (3.04e-3)     -0.01*** (4.55e-3) 
Nonstop_going    65.87*** (14.84)   154.62** (70.26) 55.48*** (18.94)    55.01** (21.45) 
Nonstop_coming  104.74*** (15.05)   134.15* (69.78) 107.86*** (19.50)    91.42*** (22.18) 
Itinerary_dist_going       0.01 (0.02) 2.87e-3 (0.04) -0.01 (0.02)      0.01 (0.04) 
Itinerary_dist_coming       0.07*** (0.02)       0.05 (0.04) 0.04** (0.02)      0.12** (0.05) 
Trad_1_going     31.75** (13.35)   112.58** (50.60) 19.57 (16.67)    52.26*** (17.47) 
Trad_2_going       0.20 (57.31)     62.62 (110.28) -7.35 (63.66)    20.18 (132.05) 
Trad_1_coming     49.72*** (12.49)    -15.66 (52.19) 64.04*** (15.27)      4.61 (15.19) 
Trad_2_coming     99.29* (53.70)     45.67 (137.45) 90.13 (61.85)  205.88* (121.45) 
Virtual_going       9.78 (17.00)      -8.35 (61.72) 18.19 (22.04)      5.98 (20.38) 
Virtual_coming     91.51*** (17.20)     21.24 (61.86) 116.11*** (22.34)    37.45* (20.37) 
AA/LA_market_co  -572.83*** (186.88)  -505.16*** (192.25) - - - - 
AA/LA_product   131.88*** (31.40)   304.10* (167.14) - - - - 
AA/LA_product_co   536.23*** (198.36)   407.29 (250.69) - - - - 
DL/AF_market_co  -126.12** (60.50) - - -115.85* (61.50) - - 
DL/AF_product     22.37 (18.02) - - 31.83 (26.94) - - 
DL/AF_product_co   146.40 (92.27) - - 127.46 (93.28) - - 
UA/AC_market_co     53.50 (46.31) - - - -  156.28*** (52.44) 
UA/AC_product  -151.55*** (21.97) - - - -     -6.00 (24.93) 
UA/AC_product_co  -205.14*** (62.61) - - - - -144.90** (58.71) 
Constant   821.54*** (293.61)  -200.92 (322.60) 1,129.10*** (325.85) -152.94 (135.57) 
Obs 60,971 5,356 43,329 12,331 
R
2
 0.1791 0.1709 0.1242 0.2009 
Wu-Hausman (χ2) 14.978** 4.475 1.892 9.633*** 
*indicates significance at the 10% level, **indicates significance at the 5% level and ***indicates significance at the 1% level. 
Quarter, year, operating carrier, origin and destination fixed effects are included. 
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 Inferences from Reduced-form Price Equation Estimation 
 One important facet regulators may be concerned with is the ultimate effect of granting 
ATI on price for consumers.  In light of this, we estimate a reduced-form price regression using 
the following specification: 
 
           
                                                 
                           
     
,        (16) 
 
where      is a vector consisting of the subsequent list of variables: a constant, Mc_opres, 
Mc_opres
2
, Nonstop_going, Nonstop_coming, Route_qual_going, Route_qual_coming, 
Itinerary_dist_going, Itinerary_dist_coming, Close_comp_going, Close_comp_coming, 
Trad_1_going, Trad_1_coming, Trad_2_going, Trad_2_coming, Virtual_going and 
Virtual_coming.  As with estimations of the markup and marginal cost equations, similar price 
equation regression models are estimated within each of the other three subsamples.  Concerns 
over the endogeneity of AA/LA_market_co, DL/AF_market_co and UA/AC_market_co are still 
present in the reduced-form price equation specification; thus, we again implement the  Two-
stage IV estimator, where the first-stage regression equation is the previously discussed equation 
(14). The Two-stage IV results are reported in Table 1.11, but for comparison we report the OLS 
results in Table 1.10. 
 The Wu-Hausman test results indicate that we can reject the null hypothesis that the 
variables are exogenous in two of the four subsamples.  Given the evidence that the variables of 
interest may be endogenous, the discussion focuses on the Two-stage IV.  Much of the 
subsequent discussion focuses on results from the combined subsample as these qualitative 
results when compared to the smaller subsamples are quite consistent. 
 First, consider the coefficient estimates on Mc_opres and Mc_opres
2
.  These estimates 
indicate that the greater the origin presence of an airline, the higher the price it will charge, but 
the price impact of an airline's origin presence occurs at a diminishing rate, all else constant.  
This particular result is suggestive of the presence of economies of passenger-traffic density that 
we also found in estimations of the marginal cost functions previously discussed.   
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 Estimates of the coefficients for nonstop products are positive, indicating that, all else 
constant, prices are higher on nonstop products versus products with intermediate stops.  This 
follows from the empirically supported idea that consumers view intermediate stops as travel-
inconveniences, which allows carriers to put a higher markup on their nonstop products.  In the 
spirit of consumers preferring streamlined travel, the coefficient estimate on Route_qual_coming 
is positive as expected, suggesting that the greater the routing quality on the coming portion of 
the itinerary, the higher the price will be, all else constant.  However, coefficient estimates for 
Route_qual_going in all the subsamples are not statistically significant.   
 The coefficient estimates regarding itinerary distance for the coming portion of the 
itinerary indicate that, the greater the flying distance of the product, the greater the price, all else 
constant.  In the combined sample, the coefficient estimates for Close_comp_coming is positive, 
suggesting that a product's price is positively related to the number of competing products with 
equivalent number of intermediate stops to the product in question.  However, results are mixed 
across the subsamples regarding the price impact of Close_comp_going and 
Close_comp_coming.  For instance, in the AA/LA subsample the coefficient estimate on 
Close_comp_going is positive, but negative for Close_comp_coming. 
 Contrary to findings by Ito and Lee (2007) on price effects of virtual codesharing in 
domestic air travel markets, we find that in international air travel markets virtually codeshared 
products have higher prices relative to pure online products, at least for the coming portion of the 
itinerary, all else constant.  Our previous estimation results on the markup and marginal cost 
comparisons of virtual codeshare and pure online products suggest that the higher price we now 
find for virtual codeshare product features is driven by higher marginal cost of virtual codeshare 
product features. 
 The coefficient estimates concerning type 1 traditionally codeshared products are positive 
and significant.  Thus, there is evidence that all else constant, prices for type 1 traditionally 
codeshared products have higher prices than pure online products.  This follows from our 
previous findings that traditional codeshare products tend to have larger markup and marginal 
cost compared to pure online products.  Similar evidence is also present with respect to type 2 
traditionally codeshared products. 
 Turning attention to the variables of interest, the coefficient estimates for variables 
AA/LA_market_co and DL/AF_market_co are each negative.  Products in the designated carve-
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out markets for AA and LA on average have prices about $536 lower than non-carve-out 
markets, all else constant.  In the case of the designated DL and AF carve-out markets, prices are 
about $123 lower on average relative to non-carve-out markets.  The estimated coefficient for 
UA/AC_market_co implies that prices are on average $94 higher in these partners‟ carve-out 
markets relative to their non-carve-out markets.   
 The coefficient estimate on AA/LA_product suggests that on average AA and LA product 
prices are higher than competitors‟ products in non-carve-out markets by about $136, all else 
constant.  This result follows from the evidence that these ATI partners have higher marginal 
costs relative to their competitors in their non-carve-out markets.  In the case of DL and AF, the 
analogous coefficient estimate suggests their products‟ prices are not statistically different than 
competitors‟ products in non-carve-out markets.  In contrast, UA and AC products have lower 
prices relative to their competitors in non-carve-out markets by approximately $156 on average, 
all else constant.  This UA/AC price comparison result is consistent with the evidence from our 
previous estimations that UA and AC products on average have lower marginal costs relative to 
their competitors. 
 In order to examine how prices of the ATI partners‟ products differ in their carve-out 
versus non-carve-out markets, we must turn to the coefficient estimates for variables 
AA/LA_product_co, DL/AF_product_co and UA/AC _product_co.  First, the relative prices of 
AA and LA products in their carve-out markets are on average approximately $506 greater than 
in non-carve-out markets, all else constant.  Perhaps resulting from the carve-out policy, 
coordination efficiencies are not realized in the ATI partners‟ carve-out market, thus leading to 
higher marginal costs.  Second, the results suggest that on average the relative prices of DL and 
AF products are about $174 higher in their carve-out markets compared to non-carve-out 
markets.  Based on evidence from our markup regressions that these respective ATI partners may 
be tacitly colluding, it is not surprising that prices for their products are relatively higher in their 
carve-out markets.   
 With regards to UA and AC, relative prices for their products are on average lower in 
their carve-out markets by about $193 compared to non-carve-out markets, all else constant.  
Although, there is some evidence that in spite of the carve-out policy, UA and AC may engage in 
some tacit collusion as a result of their relatively higher markups in their carve-out markets, there 
is also evidence that the tacit cooperation allows these carriers to achieve efficiencies in their 
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carve-out markets.  Since overall their prices are relatively lower, the latter effect appears to 
dominate. 
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Table 1.10 Price Regression Estimates on Subsamples of Markets with Partner Service Overlap (OLS) 
  
Combined sample markets with  
AA/LA, DL/AF or UA/AC  
service overlap 
Subsample markets with 
AA/LA service overlap 
Subsample markets with 
 DL/AF service overlap 
Subsample markets with 
UA/AC service overlap 
Variable Est. Std. Error Est. Std. Error Est. Std. Error Est. Std. Error 
Mc_opres      4.28*** (0.37)         8.41*** (1.40)      4.09*** (0.48)     2.20*** (0.55) 
Mc_opres
2
     -0.01*** (2.50e-3)        -0.03*** (0.01)     -0.01*** (3.03e-3)    -0.01 (4.66e-3) 
Nonstop_going    61.06*** (16.81)     195.35** (77.86)    55.70*** (21.15)   28.64 (26.49) 
Nonstop_coming  108.93*** (16.57)         5.86 (75.47)  120.53*** (20.81)   57.43** (26.44) 
Route_qual_going      0.19 (0.85)        -6.47 (8.68)     -1.48 (3.36)    -0.32 (1.70) 
Route_qual_coming      2.59*** (0.83)       18.84* (9.63)    11.76*** (3.52)     1.38 (1.63) 
Itinerary_dist_going -3.02e-3 (0.02)        -0.08 (0.14)     -0.04 (0.06)    -0.01 (0.08) 
Itinerary_dist_coming      0.10*** (0.03)         0.30* (0.16)      0.23*** (0.06)     0.14* (0.08) 
Close_comp_going     -0.20 (0.58)       11.31** (5.07)     -0.44 (0.69)    -2.04** (0.96) 
Close_comp_coming      1.00* (0.57)      -12.94*** (4.87)      1.58** (0.67)    -2.19** (0.96) 
Trad_1_going    30.43** (13.48)     125.97** (51.87)    16.17 (16.86)   55.77*** (17.71) 
Trad_2_going     -0.79 (57.60)       44.00 (111.15)     -9.75 (64.12)   23.35 (135.56) 
Trad_1_coming    52.01*** (12.66)      -12.98 (51.72)    65.36*** (15.54)     8.41 (15.41) 
Trad_2_coming    99.57* (53.92)       53.85 (131.94)    91.42 (62.24) 219.14* (123.19) 
Virtual_going      5.09 (17.02)      -24.08 (61.56)    11.30 (22.14)   13.07 (20.42) 
Virtual_coming    88.18*** (17.26)       21.35 (62.20)  113.08*** (22.46)   40.92* (20.45) 
AA/LA_market_co -343.25** (140.74)    -315.02** (141.04) - - - - 
AA/LA_product  136.63*** (31.22)     272.80 (169.04) - - - - 
AA/LA_product_co  495.30*** (149.61)     426.67*** (165.94) - - - - 
DL/AF_market_co -140.92*** (43.21) - - -147.74*** (43.80) - - 
DL/AF_product    23.26 (18.09) - -    30.08 (27.05) - - 
DL/AF_product_co  233.72*** (71.61) - -  213.21*** (71.93) - - 
UA/AC_market_co    17.40 (28.74) - - - -   95.94*** (34.67) 
UA/AC_product -158.67*** (22.08) - - - -    -8.64 (24.94) 
UA/AC_product_co   -63.82 (40.43) - - - -  -85.16** (40.05) 
Constant  849.62*** (299.63) -1,818.22* (1,065.30) -759.40 (664.40) 231.78 (146.35) 
Obs 60,971 5,356 43,329 12,331 
R
2
 0.1801 0.1751 0.1253 0.2090 
*indicates significance at the 10% level, **indicates significance at the 5% level and ***indicates significance at the 1% level. 
Quarter, year, operating carrier, origin and destination fixed effects are included. 
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Table 1.11 Price Regression Estimates on Subsamples of Markets with Partner Service Overlap (Two-stage IV) 
  
Combined sample markets with  
AA/LA, DL/AF or UA/AC  
service overlap 
Subsample markets with 
AA/LA service overlap 
Subsample markets with 
 DL/AF service overlap 
Subsample markets with 
UA/AC service overlap 
Variable Est. Std. Error Est. Std. Error Est. Std. Error Est. Std. Error 
Mc_opres       4.28*** (0.37)         8.35*** (1.38)      4.06*** (0.48)       2.30*** (0.55) 
Mc_opres
2
      -0.01*** (2.52e-3)        -0.03*** (0.01)     -0.01*** (3.04e-3)      -0.01 (4.56e-3) 
Nonstop_going     64.11*** (16.92)     221.86*** (81.87)    57.20*** (21.07)     29.29 (26.28) 
Nonstop_coming   111.97*** (16.62)       30.06 (77.05)  122.20*** (20.80)     58.30** (26.23) 
Route_qual_going       0.22 (0.85)        -5.27 (8.68)     -1.43 (3.35)      -0.33 (1.69) 
Route_qual_coming       2.57*** (0.83)       19.36** (9.59)    11.80*** (3.51)       1.34 (1.62) 
Itinerary_dist_going -2.13e-3 (0.02)        -0.06 (0.14)     -0.03 (0.06)      -0.01 (0.08) 
Itinerary_dist_coming       0.10*** (0.03)         0.31* (0.16)      0.23*** (0.06)       0.14* (0.08) 
Close_comp_going      -0.24 (0.58)       11.53** (5.07)     -0.46 (0.68)      -2.14** (0.95) 
Close_comp_coming       0.96* (0.57)      -13.13*** (4.84)      1.56** (0.67)      -2.27** (0.95) 
Trad_1_going     30.57** (13.43)     122.10** (51.05)    16.65 (16.80)     55.72*** (17.60) 
Trad_2_going      -0.30 (57.40)       40.88 (110.41)     -9.41 (63.86)     24.20 (134.62) 
Trad_1_coming     51.86*** (12.63)      -20.34 (52.24)    65.73*** (15.47)       8.78 (15.30) 
Trad_2_coming     99.48* (53.75)       55.91 (131.02)    91.57 (62.00)   220.25* (122.35) 
Virtual_going       5.74 (16.99)      -16.99 (61.57)    11.49 (22.06)     12.51 (20.28) 
Virtual_coming     88.80*** (17.21)       25.57 (61.64)  113.29*** (22.38)     41.45** (20.31) 
AA/LA_market_co  -535.94*** (185.50)    -525.62*** (197.17) - - - - 
AA/LA_product   135.87*** (31.43)     273.66 (167.64) - - - - 
AA/LA_product_co   506.47** (198.02)     406.82 (258.76) - - - - 
DL/AF_market_co  -122.58** (60.57) - - -121.54** (61.75) - - 
DL/AF_product     22.91 (18.06) - -    29.46 (26.95) - - 
DL/AF_product_co   173.56* (92.23) - -  147.31 (93.19) - - 
UA/AC_market_co     94.12** (45.80) - - - -   168.26*** (51.28) 
UA/AC_product  -156.40*** (22.34) - - - -      -9.30 (24.91) 
UA/AC_product_co  -192.52*** (63.26) - - - -  -163.17*** (59.13) 
Constant   839.91*** (298.05) -2,178.15** (1,099.04) -780.76 (663.98)   242.08* (145.92) 
Obs 60,971 5,356 43,329 12,331 
R
2
 0.1799 0.1740 0.1253 0.2088 
Wu-Hausman (χ2) 12.047* 4.076 1.422 6.031** 
*indicates significance at the 10% level, **indicates significance at the 5% level and ***indicates significance at the 1% level. 
1
 Quarter, year, operating carrier, origin and destination fixed effects are included. 
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 1.7 Conclusion 
 The primary goal of this paper is to empirically determine the effects that a carve-out has 
on markups, costs and prices for carriers that have been granted ATI.  Upon first estimating a 
differentiated products demand model, then specifying a Nash price-setting game between 
airlines that offer these differentiated products, we were able to compute product markups and 
recover marginal costs.  Furthermore, the structural model allows us to compute markups and 
recover marginal costs under two alternative scenarios: (1) where we assume the carriers that are 
given ATI cooperate in all markets; and (2) where we assume the carriers cooperate in all 
markets except the carve-out markets, as required by a carve-out policy.  We then perform a non-
nested likelihood ratio test to identify which assumed price-setting behavior has better statistical 
support from systematic patterns in the data.  In the combined subsamples of the American 
(AA)/LAN-Chile (LA), Delta (DL)/Air France (AF) and United (UA)/Air Canada (AC) ATI 
pairings, the non-nested test result suggests that the model in which these partner carriers jointly 
set their product prices in all markets, including the carve-out markets, has better statistical 
support from systematic patterns in the data.  Thus, suggesting that there may be some tacit 
cooperation occurring between the ATI partners in the carve-out markets. 
 To further investigate this result we examine how markups, marginal costs and prices 
differ for the respective ATI partners in their carve-out versus non-carve-out markets.  Results 
from the markup equation estimations suggest that for DL and AF, as well as UA and AC, these 
partner carriers' products have relatively higher markups in their respective carve-out markets 
compared to their non-carve-out markets.  Furthermore, in the case of AA and LA, these ATI 
partners are marking up their products in their carve-out markets in the same manner as their 
non-carve-out markets.  Together, these results provide strong supporting evidence that some 
tacit collusion is occurring in spite of the carve-out policy.   
 Results from the marginal cost equation estimations suggest that, in the case of the 
AA/LA ATI pairings, the efficiencies of cooperation are not being realized in their respective 
carve-out markets.  These carriers are apparently tacitly colluding, but not realizing efficiencies 
of cooperation, each of which serve to raise prices for consumers.  For the AA/LA ATI pairing, 
their product prices relative to competitors‟ prices are on average $506 higher in their carve-out 
market versus their non-carve-out markets.  DL and AF product prices relative to competitors‟ 
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prices are on average $174 higher between their carve-out and non-carve-out markets. However, 
in the case of the UA/AC ATI pairing, we find evidence suggesting that tacit collusion between 
these partner carriers is apparently sufficient for them to achieve some cost efficiencies in their 
carve-out markets.  Furthermore, the cost efficiencies are apparently sufficiently large to result in 
lower relative prices on average for UA and AC products in their carve-out markets by 
approximately $193 on average. 
 In summary, the findings in this research, at a minimum, call into question whether 
consumers benefited from the use of the carve-out policy in the cases studied.  As such, this 
paper highlights the need for further research to better understand the efficacy of applying carve-
out policy. 
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Chapter 2 - Product Quality Effects of International Airline 
Alliances and Antitrust Immunity 
 2.1 Introduction 
 The international airline industry has undergone dramatic changes since the early 1990s.  
There has been a tendency toward increased cooperation among airlines that provide 
international air travel.  This increase in cooperation may in part be due to regulations restricting 
the ability of carriers to operate flights to various locations in a foreign country beyond the 
primary airport in the foreign country that the carrier uses to facilitate international air travel.  
Cooperation between carriers that are based in different countries effectively allows each carrier 
greater access to potential passengers in locations of a foreign country that the carrier is not 
permitted to operate its own flights.  In other words, each carrier in the partnership is able to 
leverage its foreign partner's local route network in the foreign country to better access 
passengers there.   
 Much of the existing literature on airline cooperation focuses on the price effects of 
cooperation, and often infer welfare effects from these price effects.  However, it is well-known 
in economics that, all else equal, consumer welfare is positively related to product quality.  The 
purpose of this paper is to better understand how international cooperation among carriers affects 
the quality of the cooperating carriers‟ air travel products.  Understanding the product quality 
effects is important for a complete welfare evaluation of airline cooperation. 
 International cooperation among carriers can take various forms.  Two common types of 
cooperation involve international alliances and antitrust immunity (ATI).  These two forms of 
cooperation differ in the extent of cooperation.  For instance, international airline alliances allow 
the carriers in the alliance to codeshare flights.  Codesharing allows a carrier to sell tickets for 
seats on its partner carriers‟ planes.  Consumers can benefit from an alliance since carriers in the 
alliance may coordinate flight schedules in an attempt to decrease layover times, check baggage 
through to the final destination, share frequent flier programs and decrease the distance between 
the carriers‟ gates at airports.  These features of alliances serve to increase the convenience of 
international travel for consumers.  These travel conveniences are especially important to 
passengers traveling internationally because international air travel, as compared to domestic air 
travel, is more likely to require that passengers switch operating carriers at some point on their 
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journey.  In these cases, the products offered by each of the operating carriers are 
complementary.   
 The three international alliances are Star, Skyteam and Oneworld.  Subsets of carriers 
within these alliances do have ATI.  ATI permits more extensive cooperation in which carriers 
can cooperate on setting fares and capacity in addition to the types of cooperation that can occur 
without ATI. 
 An extensive amount of research has been conducted regarding cooperation among 
carriers in international air travel markets.  As we remarked above, this literature focuses on the 
effects of cooperation on prices.  For instance, Brueckner (2001) presents a theoretical model 
that explains what may happen to fares and welfare when cooperation among international 
carriers occurs.  The results suggest that fares will decrease and passenger traffic may increase in 
interline markets.  Interline markets are markets in which the domestic and foreign carriers‟ 
products are complements, thus requiring passengers to switch from one carrier to the next 
during the trip.  However, in interhub markets (markets in which the carriers offer substitute 
service), cooperation can have an anticompetitive effect serving to increase fares and decrease 
passenger traffic.  The literature also points out that cooperation may induce some cost 
efficiencies that serve to lower fares.
13
  Numerous empirical studies support the theory regarding 
cooperation on prices, suggesting that cooperation in the form codesharing, alliance 
participation, and ATI, benefit passengers in the form of lower fares.
14
 
 Although there is extensive literature examining the price effects of international airline 
cooperation, there is little research regarding the effects on air travel product quality.  Research 
regarding air travel product quality has focused on the relationship between competition and the 
carriers‟ on-time performance.15  Furthermore, the existing studies that explore determinants of 
air travel product quality focus on domestic air travel markets.  Thus, the primary contribution of 
this study is to examine the relationship between international airline cooperation and a carrier‟s 
                                                 
13
 Theoretical papers examining the effects of cooperation include, but are not limited to: Bilotkach (2005), Chen 
and Gayle (2007), Hassin and Shy (2004) and Park (1997). 
14
 Empirical papers examining the effects of cooperation include, but are not limited to: Brueckner and Whalen 
(2000) Brueckner (2003), Brueckner et al. (2011), Flores-Fillol and Moner-Colonques (2007), Park and Zhang 
(2000) and Oum et al. (1996). 
15
 See Mazzeo (2003), Rupp et al. (2006) and Prince and Simon (2010). 
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product quality.  The definition of quality used is directly related to the travel convenience of the 
product in terms of the directness of the product's itinerary routing (measured by distance flown) 
between the passengers' origin and destination.  This quality measure is termed routing quality 
[Chen and Gayle (2014)], and is calculated as the minimum flying distance between an 
origin/destination, divided by the actual distance flown by passengers using a specific itinerary 
routing between the origin and destination.  As the distance flown by a passenger to reach their 
destination increases relative to the minimum distance, the lower is the routing quality of the 
product.  The reasonable assumption is that, all else equal, passengers prefer the most direct 
routing to get to their destination. 
 Cooperation between carriers may require each to rearrange parts of their route network 
to facilitate network integration.  Rearrangement of networks can result in new product offerings 
and impact the average routing quality of the set of products offered by each carrier in the 
alliance.  Since a given carrier typically needs to accommodate multiple alliance partners, it is 
not clear a priori that such multi-dimensional network integration necessarily results in a given 
carrier offering products of higher routing quality.  However, to persuade regulatory authorities 
to approve formation of the alliance, which is required before the alliance can be implemented, 
carriers typically make arguments suggesting that the alliance will result in their products having 
better routing quality.  Similar arguments are often made to convince regulatory authorities to 
grant the carriers ATI. 
 For instance, in a joint application to the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) for 
ATI in 2007 involving Delta Airlines, Northwest Airlines and four European carriers, the carriers 
make the claim that 1,466 city-pair combinations will be upgraded to one-stop service and 4,071 
city-pair combinations will be upgraded to two-stop service. 
16
  Additionally, after the approval 
of this ATI application in 2008, Delta Airlines added nonstop service from Newark, Portland, 
Minneapolis/St. Paul, Seattle and Memphis among other origins to Amsterdam.  Similarly, when 
an ATI agreement between American Airlines and SN Brussels Airlines ceased in 2009, 
American Airlines then stopped offering nonstop flights from Los Angeles to Brussels.  
Although, when SN Brussels was granted ATI with United Airlines in 2009, United Airlines 
                                                 
16
 See U.S. Department of Transportation docket: Joint Application for Approval of and Antitrust Immunity for 
Alliance Agreements (Public Version), DOT-OST-2007-28644-0001-0001. 
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added nonstop service between Los Angeles and Brussels.  Note that SN Brussels was granted 
ATI with United Airlines shortly prior to joining the Star alliance with United Airlines.  These 
are just a handful of examples.  However, it is clear that cooperation can induce changes in flight 
offerings. 
 Using rigorous econometric analysis this study seeks to be the first to formally establish 
and document systematic evidence of the relationship between routing quality and international 
airline cooperation.  We estimate reduced-form regression equations that use a difference-in-
differences strategy to identify the relationship of interest.  The data sample focuses on products 
offered by the three carriers: United Airlines, Delta Airlines and American Airlines.  Each of 
these carriers is a founding member of their respective alliance and their participation in the 
alliance has not wavered over time.  Furthermore, any ATI agreement between a U.S. carrier and 
foreign carrier involves one of these carriers. 
 The results provide strong evidence that cooperation among international carriers is 
associated with an increase in a carrier‟s routing quality on average.  This is a result that is 
consistent for alliance membership and ATI among each of the three carriers examined.  
Moreover, the results indicate that an increase in alliance membership is associated with relative 
routing quality increases for online, traditional codeshare and virtual codeshare products offered 
by the carriers.
17
  In each case, the greatest relative routing quality increase shows up in the 
virtual codeshare products offered by the carriers.  The results regarding the routing quality 
effects of ATI on codeshare products are mixed.  However, a consistent result for each of these 
carriers suggests that an increase in the number of the carrier‟s ATI partners increases the 
relative routing quality of the carrier‟s online products. 
 This paper proceeds as follows.  Section 2.2 provides a brief background history of each 
of the three major international alliance and ATI with U.S. carriers, defines key concepts, as well 
as a discussion of the data used in the analysis.  Section 2.3 provides a description of the 
methodology used, while Section 2.4 discusses the empirical results.  Section 2.5 concludes the 
paper. 
 
                                                 
17
 In the following section of the paper we define and distinguish between these three types of air travel products. 
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 2.2 Background Information, Key Definitions, and Data  
 Background Information on Alliance and ATI 
 The landscape in the international airline industry has undergone rapid changes over the 
past 20 years.  There are currently three major international alliances: Star, Oneworld and 
SkyTeam.  The first of these alliances to be founded was the Star alliance in 1997.  There were 
five original members which included United Airlines.  As of the first quarter of 2005, the 
alliance had grown to include 18 official members and by the third quarter of 2011 the alliance 
included 26 official members.  The star alliance is the largest international alliance in terms of 
the number of members.  Table B.1 in the appendix provides a detailed description of how 
alliance membership for each alliance has changed since each of their inceptions.  Figure 2.1 
provides a time plot detailing how the size of the alliances has changed from the first quarter of 
2005 through the third quarter of 2011. 
 The next alliance formed was Oneworld in 1999.  There were five founding members 
including American Airlines.  The Oneworld alliance has grown to include 11 members as of the 
third quarter of 2011.  SkyTeam was also created in 1999 by Delta Airlines along with three 
international members.  In 2004, Continental Airlines and Northwest Airlines joined the 
SkyTeam alliance.  Continental Airlines was a member of the SkyTeam alliance for five years, 
before leaving and joining the Star alliance, eventually merging with United Airlines in the 
second quarter of 2010.  Delta Airlines and Northwest Airlines announced their plan to merge in 
April 2008, but their ground operations and reservations systems were not combined until 
January 31, 2010.  From 2005 through the third quarter of 2011, the SkyTeam alliance grew 
from 9 official members to 15 official members. 
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Figure 2.1 Total Number of Carriers in Three International Alliances by Time 
 
 
 Table B.2 in the appendix gives a chronological history of the DOT‟s granting of ATI to 
U.S. carriers.  One important aspect to note is the trend in ATI decisions by the DOT.  Most ATI 
rulings in the 1990s consisted of an ATI agreement between only two carriers.  However, 
recently many of these agreements have been extended to include multiple carriers. 
 The DOT‟s first ATI approval came in 1993 to Northwest and KLM ATI.  In 1996 the 
DOT granted ATI to Delta and three foreign carriers: Austrian Airlines, Sabena and Swissair.  
Also in 1996, the DOT granted ATI to United Airlines and Lufthansa.  American Airlines was 
first given ATI with Canadian Airlines in 1996 as well.  As of the first quarter of 2005, United 
Airlines had 7 ATI partners while Delta Airlines and American Airlines each had 4 ATI partners.  
Through the third quarter of 2011; however, United Airlines had ATI agreements with 13 
carriers, Delta Airlines had ATI agreements with 7 carriers and American Airlines had ATI 
agreements with 8 carriers.  Figure 2.2 illustrates how the number of ATI partners has evolved 
over this time span. 
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Figure 2.2 Total Number of ATI Partners with United Airlines, Delta Airlines and 
American Airlines by Time 
 
 
 
 This study focuses on the three carriers (United Airlines, Delta Airlines and American 
Airlines) based on their involvement in their respective alliance and their ATI agreements.  Each 
of the three carriers is a founding member of their respective alliance and their participation in 
the alliance has not changed since their alliances were formed.  However, over time other 
carriers have entered/exited the alliance.  Furthermore, each of the aforementioned carriers are 
the only U.S. carriers to have multiple ATI agreements and the number of ATI partners for each 
of these carriers has changed over time. 
 
 Key Definitions 
 Before describing the variables used in the analysis, it is worth defining a few key 
concepts.  First, a market is defined as an origin, destination and time period combination.  For 
example, Chicago to Paris in the first quarter of 2005 is a different market than Chicago to Paris 
in the second quarter of 2005.  Furthermore, there is a set of products offered by a carrier or 
carriers in each market.  A product is defined by the unique combination of ticketing carrier, 
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the passenger between the origin and destination.  Our analysis focuses on products with a single 
ticketing carrier. 
 Products in which the ticketing carrier is the same as the operating carrier on each trip 
segment are defined as online products.  For example, a product that is ticketed by United 
Airlines and United Airlines is the sole operating carrier is an online product.  However, in some 
cases the ticketing carrier and operating carrier of a product may differ.  Products that have 
multiple operating carriers are defined as traditional codeshare products.  Thus, a consumer 
travelling on an itinerary that is traditional codeshared is switching carriers at some point along 
their trip.  For instance, a product ticketed by United Airlines with one intermediate stop where 
United Airlines operates the first segment and Air Canada operates the second segment is a 
traditional codeshare product.  A product that has a single operating carrier that is different from 
the ticketing carrier is defined as a virtual codeshare product.  Thus, a product in which United 
Airlines is the ticketing carrier, but Air Canada is the sole operating carrier is a virtual codeshare 
product. 
 
 Data and Sample Selection 
 This study is performed using quarterly data from the International Passenger Origin and 
Destination Survey obtained from the U.S. Department of Transportation.  This data is a 10% 
sample of all itineraries involving an international flight segment, where at least one segment is 
operated by a U.S. carrier.  The time period examined in this study spans from the first quarter of 
2005 through the third quarter of 2011.  Each observation in the dataset is an itinerary containing 
information regarding the prices, origin airport, intermediate stop airports, destination airport, 
distance between each airport, operating carrier for each coupon segment, ticketing carrier for 
each coupon segment, and the number of passengers that purchased the itinerary at a particular 
price.  One key characteristic of this dataset is that it contains information for each direction of 
travel (going and returning/coming) on the itinerary.  Thus, there is information regarding the 
going portion of the itinerary (origin to destination) and the coming portion of the itinerary 
(destination back to origin) for roundtrip itineraries. 
 In order to properly study the effects of international airline alliance and ATI 
participation on product quality, the data are restricted to itineraries that meet specific criteria.  
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First, only roundtrip itineraries are used in the analysis.  Additionally, itineraries in which there 
are multiple ticketing carriers are excluded.  Itineraries in which the origin airport, destination 
airport or one of the intermediate airport stops occur more than once for the going portion or 
coming portion of the itinerary are also excluded.  Finally, only itineraries with a price within the 
range of $100 to $10,000 are examined.  The number of itineraries within each quarter of the 
dataset is extremely large and repeated multiple times.  Therefore, repeated itineraries are 
collapsed into uniquely defined products for each quarter.  Thus, each observation in the dataset 
represents a particular product.  The final sample consists of 2,057,144 observations/products 
spread across 541,978 markets. 
 In this study we focus on each product‟s quality of routing between the origin and 
destination, and we measure routing quality using distance travelled on an itinerary.  Given that 
information is available for the going and coming portion of an itinerary, one can separately 
measure the routing quality for the going and coming portions of the itinerary.  
Routing_quality_going is calculated as minimum flying distance between the origin/destination 
(Mindist_going) divided by the actual itinerary flying distance for the going portion of the 
itinerary.  Actual flying distance may differ across products due to differences in intermediate 
stop(s) locations across products.  Routing_quality_coming is similarly calculated for the coming 
portion of the itinerary.  Mindist_going (Mindist_coming) is calculated as the minimum distance 
on the going (coming) portion of a product in a given market.
18
  Both routing quality variables 
are measured in terms of percentage.  The highest routing quality product in each market has a 
measure of 100.  Therefore, the routing quality of each product is measured relative to the 
highest quality product in the market.  We also construct a variable, Routing_quality, that assigns 
a unique routing quality value to each product. Routing_quality is the mean of 
Routing_quality_going and Routing_quality_coming. 
 Other variables used in the study include a measure of an airline‟s origin airport presence, 
Opres.  Opres is calculated as the number of destination airports that a ticketing carrier offers 
nonstop service to leaving from a given origin airport.  N_comp_nonstop_going 
                                                 
18
 It is important to note that the minimum flying distance between the origin and destination is not always equal to 
the nonstop flying distance.  This is because there is not always a nonstop flight available between an origin and 
destination.  In cases where there is not a nonstop flight available, the minimum distance is calculated using the 
lowest itinerary distance between the origin and destination. 
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(N_comp_nonstop_coming) is defined as the total number of products in a market that do not 
require an intermediate stop on the going (coming) portion of the itinerary, and these enumerated 
products are offered by ticketing carriers that are competing with the ticketing carrier of the 
product for which N_comp_nonstop_going (N_comp_nonstop_coming) is computed.  
Analogously, N_comp_interstop_going (N_comp_interstop_coming) is defined as the total 
number of products in a market that require an intermediate stop on the going (coming) portion 
of the itinerary, and these enumerated products are offered by ticketing carriers that are 
competing with the ticketing carrier of the product for which N_comp_interstop_going 
(N_comp_interstop_coming) is computed. 
 Other key variables in the analysis include codeshare variables.  In order to create the 
codeshare variables regional carriers must be accounted for.  Specifically, to facilitate accurate 
construction of codeshare variables, we make the reasonable assumption that regional carriers 
operate for a major carrier.  For instance, consider the US domestic regional carrier SkyWest 
Airlines (OO).  The assumption is made that SkyWest Airlines is operating a coupon segment for 
the US major ticketing carrier that often transport passengers internationally.  Therefore, in the 
sample the ticketing carrier/operating carrier combination, UA/OO, would be transformed to 
UA/UA and classified as online.  This procedure ensures that when an itinerary is classified as 
having codeshare features, this codesharing is between major carriers, and therefore consistent 
with the focus of much of the literature on airline codesharing.  
Two types of codeshare variables are defined: traditional and virtual.  Traditional_going 
(Traditional_coming) is a zero-one dummy variable that takes the value one only if there are 
multiple carriers that operate respective coupon segments on the going (coming) portion of the 
itinerary.  Virtual_going (Virtual_coming) is a zero-one dummy variable that takes the value one 
only if there is one carrier that operates each coupon segment on the going (coming) portion of 
the itinerary, but the sole operating carrier is different than the ticketing carrier.  
Dummy variables are created to indicate whether a product is a United Airlines, Delta 
Airlines or American Airlines product.  UA is a dummy variable equal to one if United Airlines 
is the ticketing carrier and zero otherwise.  DL and AA are analogously defined dummy variables 
for Delta Airlines and American Airlines, respectively. 
Star is a variable indicating the total number of carriers in the Star alliance other than 
United Airlines for each quarter.  In the event that a carrier enters the alliance in a particular 
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quarter, the number of carriers in the alliance increases for that quarter.  Similarly, if a carrier 
exits the alliance in a particular quarter, the number of carriers in the alliance decreases for that 
quarter.  ATI
UA
 is defined as the total number of carriers in each quarter that have ATI agreement 
with United Airlines.  Skyteam and ATI
DL
 are analogously defined variables for the Skyteam 
alliance and ATI agreements that include Delta Airlines.  Additionally, Oneworld and ATI
AA
 are 
analogously defined variables for the Oneworld alliance and ATI agreements that include 
American Airlines.   
Table 2.1 reports summary statistics on each of the variables.  The summary statistics in 
Table 1 for the going portion of all itineraries in the sample indicate that approximately 17% of 
the products in the sample are traditionally codeshared, and about 2% are virtually codeshared.  
Therefore, approximately 81% are online products.  These statistics are similar when examining 
the coming portion of itineraries. 
The summary statistics in Table 2.1 show that approximately 17% of the products in the 
sample are United Airlines products, 24% are Delta Airlines products and 18% are American 
Airlines products.  Furthermore, Table 2.2 gives a breakdown of the types of products offered by 
the three carriers.  Table 2.2 indicates that about 23% of United Airlines products are 
traditionally codeshared and 5% are virtually codeshared.  A much larger portion of United 
Airlines products is codeshared when comparing to Delta Airlines and American Airlines.  This 
could be due to the fact that United Airlines is a member of the largest international alliance and 
has the most ATI partners.  Only about 1% of Delta Airlines‟ products are virtually codeshared 
and less than 1% of American Airlines‟ products are virtually codeshared. 
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Table 2.1 Descriptive Statistics 
(2005Q1 - 2011Q3) 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Routing_quality_going 93.90 9.29 35.71 100 
Routing_quality_coming 93.82 9.38 28.28 100 
Routing_quality 93.86 8.62 36.72 100 
Opres 26.74 41.14 0 265 
Mindist_going 3776.98 2433.80 96 14135 
Mindist_coming 3776.37 2432.39 96 14421 
N_comp_nonstop_going 0.09 0.81 0 46 
N_comp_nonstop_coming 0.09 0.81 0 47 
N_comp_interstop_going 7.29 10.94 0 137 
N_comp_interstop_coming 7.32 10.94 0 138 
Traditional_going 0.17 0.37 0 1 
Traditional_coming 0.17 0.38 0 1 
Virtual_going 0.02 0.15 0 1 
Virtual_coming 0.03 0.16 0 1 
UA 0.17 0.38 0 1 
Star 22.14 3.18 17 27 
ATI
UA
 10.40 2.24 7 13 
DL 0.24 0.43 0 1 
Skyteam 11.37 2.26 8 15 
ATI
DL 
5.17 1.11 4 7 
AA 0.18 0.38 0 1 
Oneworld 8.68 1.22 7 10 
ATI
AA
 4.65 1.67 3 8 
Observations 2,057,144    
Markets 541,978    
 
Table 2.2 Rate of Product Types by Carrier 
  UA DL AA 
Traditional_going 0.234 0.126 0.152 
Traditional_coming 0.230 0.135 0.155 
Virtual_going 0.050 0.013 0.005 
Virtual_coming 0.058 0.018 0.006 
 
 2.3 Methodology 
 The purpose of this study is to examine the effects that involvement in international 
airline alliance and ATI agreements have on a carrier‟s product quality.  Specifically, the goal is 
to determine how the routing quality of United Airlines‟, Delta Airlines‟ and American Airlines‟ 
products change when there is a change in alliance participation or ATI partners.  The following 
reduced-form regression is estimated in an attempt to answer this question, where i indexes 
product, m indexes the origin/destination combination and t indexes the time period: 
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Routing_qualityimt =  β1 + β2 Ximt + β3 UAimt + β4 Start + β5 UAimt × Start 
   + β6 ATIt
UA
 + β7UAimt × ATIt
UA
 
   + β8 DLimt + β9 Skyteamt + β10 DLimt × Skyteamt  
   + β11 ATIt
DL
 + β12 DLimt × ATIt
DL
  
   + β13 AAimt + β14 Oneworldt + β15 AAimt × Oneworldt  
   + β16 ATIt
AA
 + β17 AAimt × ATIt
AA
  
   + αi + γt + originm + destm + εimt.     (1) 
 
 Ximt is a vector of control variables that are hypothesize to influence a product‟s routing 
quality.  These controls include: (1) a measure of the origin presence of the ticketing carrier, 
captured by variable, Opres; (2) the minimum distance between the origin and destination, 
captured by variables, Mindist_going and Mindist_coming; (3) the number of products that 
competes with the product in question, captured by variables, N_comp_nonstop_going, 
N_comp_nonstop_coming, N_comp_interstop_going, and N_comp_interstop_coming 
respectively.  The set of variables in (3) control for the level of competition a product faces by 
type of competing products.  Additionally, dummy variables are included in Ximt that indicate if 
the product is traditionally codeshared or virtually codeshared.  Operating carrier fixed effects 
(αi), year and quarter fixed effects (γt), origin fixed effects (originm) and destination fixed effects 
(destm) are included to control for their unobserved effects on a product‟s routing quality. 
 The specification in equation (1) can identify how alliance participation and ATI 
membership affect routing quality of a carrier‟s products.  This is achieved through a difference-
in-differences approach.  UA, DL and AA are dummy variables indicating if the ticketing carrier 
is United Airlines, Delta Airlines or American Airlines, respectively.  Therefore β3, β8 and β13 
will illustrate how the routing quality of products offered by each of these carriers systematically 
differs from the routing quality of products offered by other carriers on average, all else constant.  
Star, Skyteam and Oneworld are as previously defined.  Likewise, ATI
UA
, ATI
DL
 and ATI
AA
 are as 
previously defined.   
 One of the variables of importance in this analysis that enables a difference-in-differences 
identification approach is the interaction variable, UA×Star.  The coefficient on this interaction 
variable, β5, indicates how, on average, an additional member in the Star alliance affects the 
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routing quality of United Airlines‟ products relative to the routing quality of non-United 
products, all else constant.  A positive value for β5 indicates that an additional member in the 
Star alliance increases the routing quality of United Airlines‟ products relative to non-United 
products, while a negative value indicates a relative decrease in routing quality of United 
Airlines‟ products.  Similarly, β7, indicates how the routing quality of United Airlines‟ products 
change on average relative to non-United products when United receives an additional ATI 
partner.  Note that β4 and β6 respectively capture how an additional member in the Star alliance 
and an additional ATI partner for United Airlines affect the routing quality of other carriers‟ 
products on average, all else constant.  The total effect of an additional Star alliance member can 
be calculated as β4 + β5.  This total effect captures the total change in routing quality of United 
Airlines‟ products on average with an additional member in the Star alliance.  Similarly, the total 
effect of an additional ATI partner of United can be calculated as β6 + β7.  β9, β10, β11 and β12 can 
be interpreted similarly for Delta Airlines and the Skyteam alliance, while β14, β15, β16 and β17 
can be interpreted similarly for American Airlines and the Oneworld alliance.   
 As mentioned previously, one characteristic of the International Passenger Origin and 
Destination Survey is that it contains information for the going and coming portions of roundtrip 
itineraries.  The method proposed in this study is to separately examine the going and coming 
portions.  In line with this, the reduced-form equation (1) will be estimated under three sets of 
information.  Equation (1) will be estimated using only the information for the going portion of 
the itinerary, using only information for the coming portion of the itinerary, and using 
information from the entire itinerary. 
 
 2.4 Estimation Results 
 The Effects of Alliance Membership and ATI on Average Routing Quality 
 Table 2.3 reports parameter estimates for equation (1).  Regressions are estimated using 
ordinary least squares (OLS).  The first column in the table shows estimation results based on 
information from the going portion of each itinerary, estimates in the second column are based 
on information from the coming portion of each itinerary, and estimates in the third column are 
based on information from each complete itinerary.  The qualitative results are quite consistent 
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across each column of estimates.  For brevity, the following discussion focuses on estimation 
results based on information from each complete itinerary. 
 The first point to be made is in regard to the constant term.  The constant term of 92.94 
indicates that the minimum distance between an origin and destination is on average 92.94% of 
the itinerary distances actually flown by passengers when all independent variables in the 
regression have a value of zero.  Although, this mean will change as values of the independent 
variables change.  The result regarding origin presence, Opres, suggests that each additional 
airport that a carrier offers nonstop service to leaving from the origin airport of the market 
increases routing quality of the carriers‟ products in that market by 0.02 percentage points on 
average.  In other words, the mean distance flown by passengers decreases and becomes closer to 
the minimum distance between the origin and destination. 
 The estimates regarding Mindist_going and Mindist_coming indicate that the greater the 
distance between an origin and destination, the greater the routing quality for products in the 
market on average.  For instance, the minimum distance between Chicago and Paris is 4,152 
miles and the minimum distance between New York and Paris is 3,635 miles.  The average 
routing quality of products from Chicago to Paris is about 0.29 points greater than the routing 
quality of products between New York and Paris (94.17% versus 93.88%).   
The number of competing products a given product faces in a market also impacts the 
product‟s routing quality.  A given product‟s routing quality tends to be higher the greater the 
number of competing products with nonstop service (going or coming) it faces.  In contrast, a 
given product‟s routing quality tends to be lower the greater the number of competing products 
with interstop service (going or coming) it faces. 
 The results indicating the effects of codesharing also provide interesting results.  A 
product can be online, traditionally codeshared or virtually codeshared.  The results indicate that 
products where the going or coming portion are traditionally codeshared have lower routing 
quality than online products on average.  Specifically, the going (coming) portion of itineraries 
that are traditionally codeshared have routing quality that is on average 0.37 percentage points 
(0.47 points) lower than routing quality of online itineraries.  Perhaps this result is primarily 
driven by the fact that traditional codeshared products require intermediate stop(s) to facilitate a 
change of operating carrier, while some online products do not have an intermediate stop.  
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Table 2.3 Routing Quality Estimation Results 
 Dependent Variable 
  Routing_quality_going Routing_quality_coming Routing Quality 
  Estimate St. Error Estimate St. Error Estimate St. Error 
Opres 0.019*** (0.000) 0.019*** (0.000) 0.020*** (0.000) 
Mindist_going 0.003*** (0.000)   
 
0.001*** (0.000) 
Mindist_coming   
 
0.003*** (0.000) 0.002*** (0.000) 
N_comp_nonstop_going 1.017*** (0.009)   
 
0.534*** (0.008) 
N_comp_nonstop_coming   
 
1.012*** (0.009) 0.547*** (0.009) 
N_comp_interstop_going -0.101*** (0.001)   
 
-0.048*** (0.001) 
N_comp_interstop_coming   
 
-0.097*** (0.001) -0.040*** (0.001) 
Traditional_going -0.682*** (0.040)   
 
-0.368*** (0.023) 
Traditional_coming   
 
-0.724*** (0.037) -0.473*** (0.023) 
Virtual_going 1.916*** (0.045)   
 
1.273*** (0.038) 
Virtual_coming   
 
1.760*** (0.041) 1.273*** (0.035) 
UA -2.726*** (0.132) -2.820*** (0.134) -2.996**** (0.123) 
Star -0.026** (0.013) -0.027** (0.013) -0.027** (0.012) 
UA×Star 0.050*** (0.008) 0.049*** (0.009) 0.047*** (0.008) 
ATI
UA
 -0.064* (0.037) -0.036 (0.037) -0.033 (0.034) 
UA×ATIUA 0.072*** (0.012) 0.072*** (0.012) 0.077*** (0.011) 
DL -4.401*** (0.094) -4.379*** (0.094) -4.217*** (0.089) 
Skyteam -0.052*** (0.009) -0.049*** (0.009) -0.047*** (0.009) 
DL×Skyteam 0.120*** (0.011) 0.115*** (0.011) 0.102*** (0.010) 
ATI
DL
 -0.028 (0.021) -0.052** (0.021) -0.044** (0.019) 
DL×ATIDL 0.188*** (0.021) 0.197*** (0.022) 0.203*** (0.020) 
AA -2.553*** (0.135) -2.404*** (0.135) -2.631*** (0.123) 
Oneworld -0.007 (0.022) -0.018 (0.022) -0.020 (0.020) 
AA×Oneworld 0.152*** (0.015) 0.141*** (0.015) 0.160*** (0.014) 
ATI
AA
 0.009 (0.010) 0.011 (0.010) 0.010 (0.009) 
AA×ATIAA 0.024** (0.011) 0.017 (0.011) 0.021** (0.009) 
Constant 93.512*** (0.651) 93.263*** (0.655) 92.943*** (0.611) 
OP Carrier FE Yes Yes Yes 
Time FE Yes Yes Yes 
Origin/Dest FE Yes Yes Yes 
R
2
 0.201 0.200 0.227 
Observations 2,057,144 
Notes: Equations are estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS). *** indicates statistical significance at the 1% 
level, ** indicates statistical significance at the 5% level and * indicates statistical significance at the 10% level.. 
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 On the other hand, products in which the going or coming portion of the itinerary are 
virtually codeshared have higher routing quality than online products on average.  Routing 
quality for products where the going (coming) itinerary portion is virtually codeshared is on 
average 1.27 percentage points (1.27 percentage points) higher than if the itinerary portion was 
online.  This result suggests that ticketing carriers of virtual codeshare products tend to practice 
this type of codesharing with operating carriers that offer online products with higher routing 
quality than the ticketing carriers‟ own online products. 
 The key variables in this analysis are the variables involving the carriers United Airlines, 
Delta Airlines and American Airlines as well as the variables regarding membership changes in 
their respective alliance and ATI agreement.  The coefficient estimate on UA suggests that the 
mean routing quality for products offered by United Airlines are 3.00 percentage points lower 
than the mean routing quality of all products in the sample.  The coefficient estimate on Star 
indicates that an additional member in the Star alliance is associated with lower routing quality 
of non-United Airlines products by 0.03 percentage points on average.  However, the coefficient 
estimates on the interaction term, UA×Star, indicates that each additional member in the Star 
alliance increases the routing quality of United Airline‟s products relative to other carriers‟ 
products by 0.05 percentage points on average.  Table 3.1 provides estimates of the total effect of 
alliance membership and ATI partnerships.  The estimates regarding the total effect of an 
additional Star alliance member provide some evidence that on average the routing quality of 
United Airlines‟ products increase with each additional Star alliance member.  The coefficient 
estimate for UA×ATIUA indicates that each additional ATI partner for United Airlines increases 
the relative routing quality of United Airlines‟ products by 0.08 percentage points on average.  
However, the total effect an additional ATI partner for United Airlines indicates there is no 
statistically significant effect on the routing quality of United Airlines‟ products. 
 The mean routing quality of Delta Airlines‟ products is about 4.22 percentage points 
lower than the mean routing quality of all products in the sample.  This is evident from the 
coefficient estimate on DL.  The coefficient estimate for Skyteam indicates that the routing 
quality of non-Delta Airlines products decreases by 0.05 percentage points on average with each 
additional member of the Skyteam alliance.  On the other hand, the results suggest that each 
additional member in the Skyteam alliance increases the routing quality of Delta Airlines‟ 
products relative other carriers‟ products on average by 0.10 percentage points.  Similarly, each 
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additional ATI partner for Delta Airlines increases the relative routing quality of Delta Airlines‟ 
products by 0.20 percentage points on average.  The total effect of an additional Skyteam 
member or ATI partner indicate an average increase in routing quality of Delta Airlines‟ 
products of about 0.06 percentage points and 0.15 percentage points, respectively. 
 In the case of American Airlines, the mean routing quality of products offered by 
American Airlines is about 2.63 percentage points lower than the mean routing quality of 
competitors‟ products.  An additional member in the Oneworld alliance has no statistically 
significant impact on the routing quality of non-American Airlines products.  Although, each 
additional member in the Oneworld alliance and each additional ATI partner increases the 
routing quality of American Airlines‟ products relative to other carriers‟ products by 0.16 
percentage points and 0.02 percentage points on average, respectively.  The total effect of an 
additional Oneworld member or ATI partner for American Airlines is associated with an increase 
in routing quality of about 0.14 percentage points and 0.03 percentage points on average, 
respectively. 
 The results concerning Delta Airlines suggest that an additional ATI partner has a bigger 
impact on routing quality of their products than an additional alliance member.  However, the 
results concerning United Airlines and American Airlines suggest that an additional ATI partner 
has a smaller impact on the routing quality of their products than an additional alliance member.  
 
Table 2.4 Total Effects of Alliance Membership and ATI Partnerships 
  Dependent Variable 
  Routing_quality_going Routing_quality_coming Routing Quality 
Total Effect Estimate F-Statistic Estimate F-Statistic Estimate F-Statistic 
Star (β4 + β5) 0.024* 2.78 0.022 2.29 0.021 2.47 
ATI
UA
 (β6 + β7) 0.008 0.04 0.036 0.89 0.044 1.61 
Skyteam (β9 + β10) 0.068*** 31.07 0.066*** 28.60 0.056*** 24.23 
ATI
DL
 (β11 + β12) 0.159*** 38.79 0.146*** 31.92 0.158*** 45.10 
Oneworld (β14 + β15) 0.145*** 31.98 0.122*** 22.50 0.141*** 36.78 
ATI
AA
 (β16 + β17) 0.033** 6.33 0.028** 4.66 0.031*** 7.05 
*** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level, ** indicates statistical significance at the 5% level and * 
indicates statistical significance at the 10% level.. 
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 The Effects on Average Routing Quality by Product Type 
 The key results shown in Table 2.3 indicate that more extensive cooperation, either in the 
form of alliance or ATI membership increase, is associated with increases in relative product 
quality.  Equation (1) can be modified to identify the changes in relative routing quality by types 
of products when there is an additional alliance member or ATI partner.  The routing quality 
effects by product type are identified by the coefficient estimates on three-way interaction 
variables included in the regressions.  For example, the coefficient estimates on three-way 
interaction variables, UA×Star×online, UA×Star×traditional, and UA×Star×virtual, identify the 
extent to which increases in membership of the Star alliance influence routing quality of United 
Airline‟s online, traditional codeshare, and virtual codeshare products relative to other carriers‟ 
products respectively.  Analogous three-way interaction variables in the cases of the other two 
alliances (Skyteam and Oneworld) and carriers (Delta Airlines and American Airlines) are 
included in the regressions to identify analogous relative routing quality effects by product types.  
An increase in the routing quality of a carrier‟s online products suggests that the carrier‟s 
rearrangement of its own network resulted in new routing to more conveniently transport 
passengers between their origin and destination.  An increase in the routing quality of a carrier‟s 
codeshare products suggests that an expansion in alliance members/ATI partners resulted in new 
higher quality routing options that require using its partner carriers‟ networks. 
 The estimation results from this modified specification are shown in Table 2.5.  Separate 
regressions are estimated using information from the going portion of itineraries and information 
from the coming portion of the itineraries, respectively.  One reason it makes sense to estimate 
separate regressions for the going and coming portions of itineraries is that each portion of an 
itinerary is either online, traditionally codeshared or virtually codeshared, but it is not always the 
case that the going portion is the same type as the coming portion. 
 First, consider the results of alliance membership.  The results indicate that an increase in 
membership in the Star alliance increases the routing quality for each type of product offered by 
United Airlines relative to competitors‟ products.  Specifically, each additional member in the 
Star alliance increases the relative routing quality of United Airlines‟ online products by 
approximately 0.02%, traditional codeshare products by 0.11% and virtual codeshare products by 
0.15% on average.  Similarly, an increase in membership in the Skyteam and Oneworld alliances 
increase the relative routing quality for each type of product offered by Delta Airlines and 
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American Airlines, respectively.  In particular, each additional member in the Skyteam increases 
the routing quality of Delta Airlines‟ online, traditional codeshare and virtual codeshare products 
relative to competitors‟ products by about 0.12%, 0.07% and 0.33% on average, respectively.19  
Likewise, each additional member in the Oneworld Alliance increases American Airlines‟ 
routing quality relative to competitors‟ products for online, traditional codeshare and virtual 
codeshare products by about 0.13%, 0.20% and 1.15% on average, respectively.  These results 
suggest that an increase in alliance membership is accompanied with higher relative routing 
quality for each type of product a carrier can offer.  Furthermore, in each of these cases, the types 
of products that experience the largest increase in relative routing quality are virtually 
codeshared products.  This suggests that the greater the number of alliance members, the greater 
the number of flights in which other alliance members can sell to conveniently transport 
passengers. 
  
                                                 
19
 Note that the coefficient indicating effect of Skyteam alliance membership on the routing quality of Delta 
Airlines‟ traditional codeshare products is not statistically significant for coming portion of the itineraries. 
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Table 2.5 Routing Quality Estimation Results for Various Types of Products 
 Dependent Variable 
  Routing_quality_going Routing_quality_coming 
  Estimate St. Error Estimate St. Error 
Opres 0.019*** (0.000) 0.019*** (0.000) 
Mindist_going 0.003*** (0.000)     
Mindist_coming     0.003*** (0.000) 
N_comp_nonstop_going 1.019*** (0.009)     
N_comp_nonstop_coming     1.012*** (0.009) 
N_comp_interstop_going -0.101*** (0.001)     
N_comp_interstop_coming     -0.097*** (0.001) 
Traditional_going -0.750*** (0.045)     
Traditional_coming     -0.762*** (0.042) 
Virtual_going 1.381*** (0.067)     
Virtual_coming     1.422*** (0.065) 
UA -2.823*** (0.136) -2.824*** (0.137) 
Star -0.027** (0.013) -0.027** (0.013) 
UA×Star×online 0.021** (0.009) 0.020** (0.009) 
UA×Star×traditional 0.108*** (0.011) 0.111*** (0.012) 
UA×Star×virtual 0.154*** (0.021) 0.124*** (0.020) 
ATI
UA
 -0.066* (0.037) -0.035 (0.037) 
UA×ATI
UA
×online 0.107*** (0.014) 0.112*** (0.014) 
UA×ATI
UA
×traditional -0.016 (0.020) -0.029 (0.021) 
UA×ATI
UA
×virtual -0.065 (0.040) -0.041 (0.039) 
DL -4.534*** (0.095) -4.468*** (0.096) 
Skyteam -0.052*** (0.009) -0.049*** (0.009) 
DL×Skyteam×online 0.120*** (0.011) 0.122*** (0.012) 
DL×Skyteam×traditional 0.070*** (0.022) 0.009 (0.022) 
DL×Skyteam×virtual 0.326*** (0.052) 0.408*** (0.047) 
ATI
DL
 -0.028 (0.021) -0.051** (0.021) 
DL×ATI
DL
×online 0.181*** (0.023) 0.180*** (0.023) 
DL×ATI
DL
×traditional 0.279*** (0.047) 0.411*** (0.046) 
DL×ATI
DL
×virtual -0.116 (0.112) -0.320*** (0.102) 
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Table 2.4 (Continued) Routing Quality Estimation Results for Various Types of Products 
 Routing_quality_going Routing_quality_coming 
 Estimate St. Error Estimate St. Error 
AA -2.757*** (0.139) -2.476*** (0.139) 
Oneworld -0.005 (0.022) -0.018 (0.022) 
AA×Oneworld×online 0.132*** (0.016) 0.129*** (0.016) 
AA×Oneworld×traditional 0.200*** (0.019) 0.153*** (0.019) 
AA×Oneworld×virtual 1.153*** (0.059) 0.967*** (0.050) 
ATI
AA
 0.008 (0.010) 0.010 (0.010) 
AA×ATI
AA
×online 0.044* (0.012) 0.037*** (0.012) 
AA×ATI
AA
×traditional -0.044** (0.018) -0.044** (0.018) 
AA×ATI
AA
×virtual -1.268*** (0.089) -1.085*** (0.074) 
Constant 93.784*** (0.653) 92.413*** (0.626) 
OP Carrier FE Yes Yes 
Time FE Yes Yes 
Origin/Dest FE Yes Yes 
R
2
 0.201 0.200 
Observations 2,057,144 
Notes: Equations are estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS).  *** indicates statistical 
significance at the 1% level and ** indicates statistical significance at the 5% level. 
 
 Next, consider the effects of ATI.  The results regarding the effects of ATI on routing 
quality of the different product types are mixed.  With regard to United Airlines, each additional 
ATI partner increases relative routing quality of United Airlines‟ online products, but not the 
relative routing quality of its codeshare products.  More precisely, each additional ATI partner 
increases relative routing quality for United Airlines‟ online products by about 0.11% on 
average.  With respect to Delta Airlines, each additional ATI partner increases the relative 
routing quality of Delta Airlines‟ online products by 0.18% and traditional codeshare products by 
0.28% on average.  The results concerning Delta Airlines‟ virtual codeshare products are mixed.  
Examining the going portion of itineraries reveals an additional ATI partner has no effect on the 
relative routing quality of Delta Airlines‟ virtual codeshare products, whereas examining the 
coming portion of itineraries reveals a decrease in the routing quality of Delta Airlines‟ virtual 
codeshare products relative to competitors‟ products of about 0.32% on average.  Finally, the 
results suggest that an additional ATI partner with American Airlines increases relative routing 
quality of American Airlines‟ online products by about 0.04% on average.  However, an 
additional ATI partner decreases relative routing quality for traditional and virtual codeshare 
products by 0.04% and 1.27% on average, respectively.   
 69 
 Although the results regarding the impact of ATI on routing quality of codeshare 
products are mixed among the three carriers, a consistent result is that an increase in membership 
of the three carriers‟ ATI partners increases relative routing quality of the three carriers‟ online 
products.  Overall, this result suggests that increases in the membership of a carrier‟s alliance or 
ATI partners incentivize the carrier to rearrange its own network to accommodate partner 
carriers‟ network, and this network rearrangement tend to result in products with higher routing 
quality. 
 
 2.5 Conclusion 
 The purpose of this study is to examine how the routing quality of products a carrier 
offers is affected by expansions in the numbers of the carrier‟s alliance and ATI partners.  Prior 
research regarding alliance membership and ATI has focused on the price effects.  However, it is 
also important to understand how cooperation affects product quality.  The empirical results are 
obtained by estimating reduced-form product quality regressions, which are specified to use a 
difference-in-differences approach for identifying relevant quality effects. 
 The results give strong evidence indicating that cooperation among international carriers 
is associated with an increase in routing quality of a carrier‟s products on average.  This result 
holds for expansions in alliance membership for each of the three carriers examined: United 
Airlines, Delta Airlines and American Airlines and expansions in ATI partnerships involving 
Delta Airlines and American Airlines.  Furthermore, the results suggest that increases in alliance 
membership are associated with relative routing quality increases for each type of product the 
carrier offers (online, traditional codeshare and virtual codeshare) with virtual codeshare 
products experiencing the greatest relative routing quality increase.  Although the results 
regarding the impact of ATI on routing quality of codeshare products are mixed among the three 
carriers, a consistent result is that an increase in membership of the three carriers‟ ATI partners 
increases relative routing quality of the three carriers‟ online products. 
 Much of the literature to date has focused on the price effects of airline cooperation, and 
have used these price effects to infer associated welfare effects.  It is well-known in economics 
that, all else equal, consumer welfare is positively related to product quality.  This research 
formally provides evidence of product quality effects associated with airline cooperation, which 
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implies that a complete welfare evaluation of airline cooperation must account for both price and 
product quality effects. 
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Appendix A - Additional Tables for Chapter 1 
Table A.1 Chronological History of ATI by U.S. Carrier 
U.S. Carriers ATI partners ATI approval ATI close-out Associated carve-outs 
Northwest KLM 1/1993    
  KLM and Alitalia* 12/1999 10/2001   
United Airlines Lufthansa 5/1996  Chicago-Frankfurt and 
Washington D.C.-Frankfurt 
  Lufthansa and SAS* 11/1996    
  Air Canada 9/1997  Chicago-Toronto and San 
Francisco-Toronto 
  Air New Zealand 4/2001  Los Angeles-Auckland and Los 
Angeles-Sydney 
  Austrian Airlines, 
Lufthansa and SAS* 
1/2001    
  Copa Airlines 5/2001    
  Asiana 5/2003    
  Austrian Airlines, 
Lufthansa, Air Canada, 
SAS, British Midland, 
LOT, Swiss International 
Air Lines and TAP*
1
 
2/2007    
  Austrian Airlines, 
Lufthansa, Air Canada, 
SAS, British Midland, 
LOT, Swiss International 
Air Lines, TAP and SN 
Brussels*
1
 
7/2009    
  ANA 11/2010     
*indicates an expansion of previous ATI decisions. 
1. British Midland did not operate in the alliance beyond 4/2012. 
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Table A.1 (Continued) Chronological History of ATI by U.S. Carrier 
U.S. Carriers ATI partners ATI 
approval 
ATI close-
out 
Associated carve-outs 
Delta Austrian Airlines, Sabena 
and Swissair 
6/1996 5/2007
2
 Atlanta-Zurich, Atlanta-
Brussels, Cincinnati-Zurich, 
New York-Brussels, New 
York-Vienna, New York-
Geneva and New York-Zurich 
  Air France, Alitalia, Czech 
Airlines 
1/2002  Atlanta-Paris and Cincinnati-
Paris 
  Korean Air Lines, Air 
France, Alitalia and Czech 
Airlines* 
6/2002    
  Virgin Blue Group 6/2011    
Delta and 
Northwest 
Air France, KLM, Alitalia, 
Czech Airlines* 
5/2008  Atlanta-Paris and Cincinnati-
Paris carve-outs removed 
American Airlines Canadian Airlines 7/1996 5/2007
3
 New York-Toronto 
  LAN 9/1999  Miami-Santiago 
  Swissair 5/2000 11/2001 Chicago-Brussels 
  Sabena 5/2000 3/2002 Chicago-Zurich 
  Finnair 7/2002    
  Swiss International Air 
Lines 
11/2002 8/2005   
  SN Brussels 4/2004 10/2009   
  LAN and LAN-Peru* 10/2005  Miami-Lima 
  British Airways, Iberia, 
Finnair and Royal 
Jordanian* 
7/2010    
  Japan Airlines 11/2010     
*indicates an expansion of previous ATI decisions. 
2. Although not officially closed until 2007, this alliance was only active until 8/2000. 
3. Although not officially closed until 2007, this alliance was only active until 6/2000. 
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Table A.2 Marginal Cost Regressions using AA/LA Carve-out Markets 
  
ATI Partners Cooperate in  
all markets 
ATI Partners Cooperate only in 
non-carve-out markets 
Variable Estimates Std. Error Estimates Std. Error 
Mc_opres       11.44 (21.50)        10.99 (21.49) 
Mc_opres
2
        -0.03 (0.41)         -0.03 (0.41) 
Nonstop_going     392.13 (376.51)      393.56 (376.44) 
Nonstop_coming  1,428.70 (1,008.59)   1,429.33 (1,007.64) 
Itinerary_dist_going         0.02 (0.07)          0.02 (0.07) 
Itinerary_dist_coming         0.78* (0.47)          0.78* (0.47) 
Trad_1_going  1,996.52*** (204.76)   1,991.52*** (204.55) 
Trad_1_coming  5,267.44*** (1,020.02)   5,267.98*** (1,019.06) 
Virtual_going    -145.49 (129.34)     -145.13 (129.30) 
Virtual_coming    -136.43 (103.81)     -136.23 (103.84) 
Constant -4,426.27* (2,440.38)  -4,425.37* (2,437.94) 
Quarter FE yes yes 
Year FE yes yes 
Operating carrier FE yes yes 
Origin/Destination FE yes yes 
Observations 191 191 
R
2
 0.4597 0.4590 
Non-nested test stat -0.9719   
*indicates significance at the 10% level, **indicates significance at the 5% level  
and ***indicates significance at the 1% level. 
 
Table A.3 Marginal Cost Regressions using DL/AF Overlap Carve-out Markets 
  
ATI Partners Cooperate in  
all markets 
ATI Partners Cooperate only in  
non-carve-out markets 
Variable Estimates Std. Error Estimates Std. Error 
Mc_opres         0.29 (4.23)          0.07 (4.23) 
Mc_opres
2
        -0.02 (0.02)         -0.02 (0.02) 
Nonstop_going     364.99** (168.61)      365.09** (168.58) 
Nonstop_coming     535.46*** (153.04)      535.35*** (153.00) 
Itinerary_dist_going         0.49* (0.27)          0.49* (0.27) 
Itinerary_dist_coming        -0.04 (0.14)         -0.04 (0.14) 
Trad_1_going       76.08 (196.79)        75.71 (196.76) 
Trad_1_coming     523.84*** (186.10)      523.46*** (186.06) 
Virtual_going      -56.16 (156.44)       -56.65 (156.42) 
Virtual_coming     146.50 (152.83)      146.21 (152.85) 
Constant -1,977.80 (1,222.11)  -1,955.22 (1,221.65) 
Quarter FE yes yes 
Year FE yes yes 
Operating carrier FE yes yes 
Origin/Destination FE yes yes 
Observations 894 894 
R
2
 0.2175 0.2194 
Non-nested test stat 0.2303   
*indicates significance at the 10% level, **indicates significance at the 5% level  
and ***indicates significance at the 1% level. 
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Table A.4 Marginal Cost Regressions using UA/AC Overlap Carve-out Markets 
  
ATI Partners Cooperate in  
all markets 
ATI Partners Cooperate only in  
non-carve-out markets 
Variable Estimates Std. Error Estimates Std. Error 
Mc_opres      5.57** (2.35)        5.29** (2.34) 
Mc_opres
2
     -0.04** (0.02)       -0.04** (0.02) 
Nonstop_going    99.32** (44.75)      99.72** (44.76) 
Nonstop_coming   -66.65 (41.93)     -66.29 (41.96) 
Itinerary_dist_going      0.12 (0.10)        0.12 (0.10) 
Itinerary_dist_coming     -0.05 (0.10)       -0.05 (0.10) 
Trad_1_going    86.00 (106.22)      86.33 (106.22) 
Trad_1_coming    69.00 (98.99)      69.82 (99.03) 
Virtual_going  141.25 (115.63)    141.31 (115.66) 
Virtual_coming  190.98* (114.85)    191.36* (114.82) 
Constant      3.94 (182.34)      10.41 (182.09) 
Quarter FE yes yes 
Year FE yes yes 
Operating carrier FE yes yes 
Origin/Destination FE yes yes 
Observations 435 435 
R
2
 0.1708 0.1704 
Non-nested test stat 0.2077   
*indicates significance at the 10% level, **indicates significance at the 5% level  
and ***indicates significance at the 1% level. 
 
Table A.5 Marginal Cost Regressions using AA/LA, DL/AF and UA/AC Overlap Carve-out 
Markets 
  
ATI Partners Cooperate in  
all markets 
ATI Partners Cooperate only in  
non-carve-out markets 
Variable Estimates Std. Error Estimates Std. Error 
Mc_opres          7.79*** (2.51)           7.64*** (2.51) 
Mc_opres
2
         -0.05*** (0.02)          -0.05*** (0.02) 
Nonstop_going      457.89*** (102.54)       461.88*** (102.55) 
Nonstop_coming      403.86*** (84.67)       407.54*** (84.72) 
Itinerary_dist_going          0.18 (0.15)           0.18 (0.15) 
Itinerary_dist_coming          0.15 (0.15)           0.15 (0.15) 
Trad_1_going      200.89 (131.89)       203.64 (131.90) 
Trad_1_coming      362.86*** (112.88)       365.63*** (112.90) 
Virtual_going        36.68 (99.47)         37.92 (99.51) 
Virtual_coming      117.29 (98.06)       118.23 (98.11) 
Constant  -1,684.19** (806.71)   -1,676.32** (806.79) 
Quarter FE yes yes 
Year FE yes yes 
Operating carrier FE yes yes 
Origin/Destination FE yes yes 
Observations 1,520 1,520 
R
2
 0.2372 0.2389 
Non-nested test stat 2.2204   
*indicates significance at the 10% level, **indicates significance at the 5% level  
and ***indicates significance at the 1% level. 
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Appendix B - Additional Tables for Chapter 2 
Table B.1 Chronological History of Alliance Participation by Alliance 
Alliance Carriers Dates beginning Dates ended 
Star United Airlines, Air Canada, Lufthansa, SAS and Thai Airways 5/1997   
  VARIG Brazilian Airlines 10/1997   
  Ansett Australia, Air New Zealand and ANA 3/1999   
  Austrian Airlines Group
1
 3/2000   
  Singapore Airlines 4/2000   
  British Midland and Mexicana Airlines 7/2000   
  Ansett Australia  3/2002 
  Asiana Airlines 3/2003   
  Spanair 4/2003   
  LOT Polish Airlines 10/2003   
  Mexicana Airlines  3/2004 
  US Airways 5/2004   
  Blue 1
2
, Adria Airways and Croatia Airlines 11/2004   
  TAP Portugal 5/2005   
  South African Airways and Swiss Int. Air Lines 4/2006   
  VARIG Brazilian Airlines  1/2007 
  Air China and Shanghai Airlines 12/2007   
  Turkish Airlines 4/2008   
  EGYPTAIR 7/2008   
  Continental 10/2009   
  SN Brussels Airlines 12/2009   
  Continental
3
  5/2010 
  TAM 5/2010   
  Aegean Airlines 6/2010   
  Shanghai Airlines   10/2010 
1. Austrian Airlines, Tyrolean and Lauda Air compose the Austrian Airlines Group 
2. Blue 1 is a regional carrier 
3. United Airlines and Continental merge 
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Table B.1 (Continued) Chronological History of Alliance Participation by Alliance 
Alliance Carriers Dates beginning Dates ended 
Oneworld American Airlines, British Airways, Cathay Pacific, 
Canadian Airlines and Qantas 
2/1999  
  Finnair and Iberia 9/1999   
  Canadian Airlines  6/2000 
  Air Lingus and LAN-Chile 6/2000   
  Air Lingus  4/2007 
  Japan Airlines, Malev and Royal Jordanian 4/2007   
  Mexicana Airlines 11/2009 8/2010 
  S7 Airlines 11/2010   
SkyTeam Delta Airlines, Air France, Aeromexico and Korean Air 6/1999   
  Czech Airlines 3/2001   
  Alitalia 7/2001   
  Continental, Northwest and KLM
4
 9/2004   
  Aeroflot 4/2006   
  Air Europa, Copa Airlines and Kenya Airlines 9/2007   
  China Southern Airlines 11/2007   
  Continental and Copa Airlines  10/2009 
  Northwest
5
  1/2010 
  Vietnam Airlines and TAROM Romanian Air 6/2010   
  China Eastern 6/2011   
  China Airlines 9/2011   
4. Northwest and KLM alliance partners since 1/1993 
5. Delta and Northwest announced their plan to merge in April 2008, but their ground operations and reservations 
systems were not combined until January 31, 2010. 
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Table B.2 Chronological History of ATI by U.S. Carrier 
U.S. Carriers ATI partners ATI approval ATI close-out Associated carve-outs 
Northwest KLM 1/1993    
  KLM and Alitalia* 12/1999 10/2001   
United Airlines Lufthansa 5/1996  Chicago-Frankfurt and 
Washington D.C.-Frankfurt 
  Lufthansa and SAS* 11/1996    
  Air Canada 9/1997  Chicago-Toronto and San 
Francisco-Toronto 
  Austrian Airlines, 
Lufthansa and SAS* 
1/2001    
  Air New Zealand 4/2001  Los Angeles-Auckland and Los 
Angeles-Sydney 
  Copa Airlines 5/2001    
  Asiana 5/2003    
  Austrian Airlines, 
Lufthansa, Air Canada, 
SAS, British Midland, 
LOT, Swiss International 
Air Lines and TAP*
1
 
2/2007    
  Austrian Airlines, 
Lufthansa, Air Canada, 
SAS, British Midland, 
LOT, Swiss International 
Air Lines and TAP, SN 
Brussels Airlines*
1
 
7/2009    
  ANA 11/2010     
*indicates an expansion of previous ATI decisions. 
1. British Midland did not operate in the alliance beyond 4/2012. 
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Table B.2 (Continued) Chronological History of ATI by U.S. Carrier 
Table A2 Cont. Chronological history of ATI by U.S. Carrier 
U.S. Carriers ATI partners ATI 
approval 
ATI close-
out 
Associated carve-outs 
Delta Airlines Austrian Airlines, Sabena 
and Swissair 
6/1996 5/2007
2
 Atlanta-Zurich, Atlanta-
Brussels, Cincinnati-Zurich, 
New York-Brussels, New York-
Vienna, New York-Geneva and 
New York-Zurich 
  Air France, Alitalia, Czech 
Airlines 
1/2002  Atlanta-Paris and Cincinnati-
Paris 
  Korean Air, Air France, 
Alitalia and Czech 
Airlines* 
6/2002    
  Virgin Australia 6/2011    
Delta Airlines 
and Northwest 
Korean Air, Air France, 
KLM, Alitalia, Czech 
Airlines* 
5/2008  Atlanta-Paris and Cincinnati-
Paris carve-outs removed 
American 
Airlines 
Canadian Airlines 7/1996 5/2007
3
 New York-Toronto 
  LAN 9/1999  Miami-Santiago 
  Swissair 5/2000 11/2001 Chicago-Brussels 
  Sabena 5/2000 3/2002 Chicago-Zurich 
  Finnair 7/2002    
  Swiss International Air 
Lines 
11/2002 8/2005   
  SN Brussels 4/2004 10/2009   
  LAN and LAN-Peru* 10/2005  Miami-Lima 
  British Airways, Iberia, 
Finnair and Royal 
Jordanian* 
7/2010    
  Japan Airlines 11/2010     
*indicates an expansion of previous ATI decisions. 
2. Although not officially closed until 2007, this alliance was only active until 8/2000 
3. Although not officially closed until 2007, this alliance was only active until 6/2000 
 
